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Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement
Thomas F. Cotter*
ABSTRACT: Economic analysis has long suggested that there are two
distinct categories of cases in which the fair use defense, which permits the
unauthorized reproduction and other use of copyrighted materials, should
apply. First,fair use should apply when the transaction costs of negotiating
with the copyright ownerfor permission to use exceed the private value of the
use to the would-be user. Second, fair use should apply when the individual
use is thought to generatesome positive externality-such that the net social
value of the use exceeds the value to the copyright owner of preventing the
use-which in turn may exceed the value of the use to the individual user.
Considerableanecdotal evidence, however, suggests that would-be users are
often deterred from engaging in conduct that likely would fall within the
ambit offair use, due in part to concerns over incurringattorney'sfees and
in partto the uncertainty and unpredictabilityof the fair use doctrine itself.
This Article presents a model of the private costs and benefits faced by
would-be users of copyrighted materials in precisely those settings in which
economic analysis suggests that the fair use doctrine should apply. The
model demonstrates how, under current law, this balance of private costs
and benefits may cause some users to forgo legitimatefair uses, particularly
when those users are risk averse. It also suggests that, in cases in which fair
use is justified by the presence of positive externalities flowing from the
individual user's use, the asymmetry between the individual user's gain and
the copyright owner's loss may result in systematic copyright
overenforcement. Put another way, the fair use doctrine suffers from an
"appropriability" problem similar to that which is often cited as a
justification for copyright protection itself This Article then offers some
observations on the likely effectiveness of six different types of fair use
reforms.
* Professor of Law and Solly Robins Distinguished Research Fellow, University of
Minnesota Law School. I thank Professors Pamela Samuelson and Robert Merges for inviting
me to present an earlier version of this paper at their Intellectual Property Scholarship Seminar
at the University of California at Berkeley in September 2006; participants at that seminar, at a
faculty workshop at the University of Minnesota, and at the 2007 Intellectual Property Scholars
Conference at DePaul University, for their comments and criticism; Brett Frischmann, Shubha
Ghosh, James Gibson, Mark Lemley, Lydia Loren, and Michael Risch, for their thoughtful
observations; and Sharada Devarasetty for research assistance. Any errors that remain are mine.
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INTRODUCTION

A frequently voiced criticism of the U.S. copyright system is that it
enables persons claiming copyright interests to "overclaim"-that is, to
successfully assert rights over content, despite the fact that either (1) the
content at issue is not subject to copyright protection at all, perhaps because
it has fallen into the public domain, or because it comprises uncopyrightable
facts, ideas, scenes A faire, or de minimis fragments of expression, or (2) a
specific use of that content is permissible under, for example, the fair use
doctrine.' Although some of the criticism is directed at courts' alleged
misapplication of the governing legal rules and standards, much of it has
begun to focus on structural features that sometimes compel would-be users
to give in to copyright owners' expansive interpretations of the scope of the
owners' rights. Among these features are the potentially high costs of
fending off even weak copyright infringement suits; endemic risk aversion
on the part of all parties involved, including the providers of errors and
omissions ("E&O") insurance; and, relatedly, the often complex, factspecific, and hence relatively unpredictable nature of the governing

1.
See, e.g., PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETERJASZI, CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, UNTOLD STORIES:
CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS

(2004),

available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/rock/backgrounddocs/printable_

rightsreport.pdf; MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CTR. FORJUSTICE, WILL FAIR USE
SURVIVE?: FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL (2005); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE
CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND

CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 883, 887-906 (2007); William F. Patty & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use
and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1655-56 (2004). To be sure,
criticism of the current regime is not universal. Some thoughtful commentators, such as
Christopher Yoo, argue in favor of a relatively robust bundle of copyright rights on the ground
that strong copyright rights induce the production of substitutes for existing works and thus
tend to minimize deadweight loss. See generally Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good
Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (2007) [hereinafter Yoo, Public Good
Economics]; Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation,79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 (2004)
[hereinafter Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation]. The premise of this Article-that various
features of the current copyright regime can result in the systematic overenforcement of
copyright rights-may result in very different policy recommendations from those advocated by
Yoo. Even so, the model presented in Part III would appear to be valid, as a formal matter, even
if one accepts Yoo's thesis; the difference in policy emphases would flow from the very different
weights Yoo and I might accord to the social benefits of copyright protection and to the positive
externalities attributable to some unauthorized uses of purportedly copyrighted material.
I also note at the outset that the assertion of weak or nonexistent intellectual property
("IP") rights is not limited to copyright or fair use doctrine in particular; patent and trademark
owners, among others, may and sometimes do assert protection over subject matter that falls
outside the scope of their IP rights as well. Thus, while the analysis presented herein is intended
to assist in evaluating various reform measures relating to copyright, much of that analysis
(including the mathematical model presented in Part III) could be adapted to evaluate other
defenses or other IP rights. This Article's emphasis on fair use may be viewed as merely one
example of a more generally applicable framework.
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standards themselves. In response, copyright scholars have suggested a
variety of reforms, many of which are directed towards making the fair use
doctrine more effective in accomplishing its assumed purpose of
encouraging the unauthorized use of copyrighted material under
circumstances in which unauthorized use is expected either to cause the
copyright owner no harm or to produce positive social benefits
(externalities) that outweigh that harm. Depending on the circumstances,
these externalities may flow from uses for purposes such as criticism,
reporting, or research or for other educational or transformative endeavors.
What is often missing in the literature, however, is an appreciation of
the many different reasons why fair use (and other copyright doctrines)
sometimes crumbles in the face of expansive assertions of copyright rights;
how these reasons relate to one another; and how various proposed reforms
might alleviate some (but probably not all) of the underlying problems.
Focusing principally on fair use as a doctrine that, in the opinion of many
critics, often is underenforced in the presence of copyright overclaiming,
this Article argues below that one reason fair use may fail to achieve its
intended purposes is inherent in the doctrine itself: to the extent fair use
rests upon the positive externalities justification, it relies on individuals
(users) to champion the public interest in the production of those
externalities without providing them with a sufficient incentive to do so. Put
another way, the fair use doctrine suffers from an "appropriability" problem
similar to the one that is often used tojustify intellectual property protection
itself.2 Copyright rights, for example, are often rationalized on the ground
that, in their absence, would-be creators of expressive works would be
unlikely to produce and publish the socially optimal amount of such works,
due to others' ability to appropriate much of the works' value without having
invested in their creation. But fair use suffers from a similar problem, insofar
as potential users whose uses would give rise to positive externalities have
less-than-optimal incentives to engage in such uses to the extent the uses

2. Lydia Loren, Mark Lemley, and Brett Frischmann have all previously made the general
point that, to the extent the use of another's asset generates positive externalities that exceed
the private value to the individual user, the owner of the asset may block the use, to the
detriment of aggregate social welfare, if the value the owner expects to derive from so doing,
though less than the increase in social welfare, exceeds the private value to the individual user.
See Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright
Permission Systems, 5J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 48-56 (1997); see also Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A.
Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 298 (2007); Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory
of Infrastructureand Commons Management,89 MINN. L. REv. 917, 976-77 (2005); Mark A. Lemley,
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1061-62 (2005). Gideon
Parchomovsky and Kevin Goldman also make this point, and contend (as do I in Part II of this
Article) that the uncertainty surrounding current fair use doctrine leads to the underutilization
of the doctrine. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors,93 VA. L. REv.
1483, 1485-86, 1497-1502 (2007). My discussion above, like that of Loren and of Parchomovsky
and Goldman, focuses on fair use as one salient example of this general phenomenon.
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would primarily benefit others. As a result, one would expect fair use to be
an underutilized right even when many real-world complications-including
the costs of litigation, potential damages liability in uncertain cases, and risk
aversion-are ignored. When these latter complications are added to the
analysis, fair use seems even less likely to attain its posited goals, giving
credence to the need for substantial reform. Unfortunately, many of the
proposed reforms threaten either to cause negative consequences that
outweigh the benefits or, if adopted and implemented in a more modest
fashion, to have only a correspondingly modest impact. Efforts to reform the
fair use doctrine can only accomplish so much, given the inherent
limitations of the doctrine itself. Perhaps policymakers would be better
advised to devote less attention to remedying fair use and other related
problems and instead to devote greater attention toward more fundamental
(though, for now, politically sensitive) measures, such as reducing the
effective term of copyright through the reintroduction of formalities or
other measures,3 devising alternative ways to compensate content
producers,4 or limiting copyright rights to cases involving commercial
exploitation.5
Part II presents a simple economic model of the fair use doctrine, and
Part III presents a model of the factors one would expect copyright owners
and users to take into account in deciding whether to acquiesce, license, or
litigate, on the one hand, or to use, license, or forgo use, on the other. The
models suggest that, even in the absence of many real-world complications,
users will forgo use in some cases in which fair use should apply under the
positive-externalities rationale. The presence of these complications further
exacerbates the underutilization problem. Part IV then examines six
different types of possible reforms, namely (1) increased reliance on liability
rules as an alternative to the present reliance on fair use or injunctive relief;
(2) changes to copyright damages rules; (3) increased use of penalties such
as the copyright misuse doctrine in response to bad faith efforts to block fair
uses; (4) changes to the standards used for awarding attorney's fees in
copyright litigation; (5) measures designed to increase the accuracy of fair
3. See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 248-56 (arguing that copyright owners should be required
to publish their works or forfeit their copyrights prematurely). See generally Christopher
Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REv. 485 (2004).
4.

See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF

ENTERTAINMENT 202-16 (2004) (proposing an equipment levy as a means of compensating
content producers); Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-PeerFile
Sharing,17 HARv.J.L. & TECH. 1, 74-83 (2003) (similar).
5. SeeJESSIcA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 180-83 (2001) (proposing a reformulation of
copyright as an exclusive right to commercial exploitation); cf Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade
Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 899, 957-58 (2007) (stating that "the problem with fair use is not
that the defense is too narrow, but that the rights to which it makes an exception are too broad"
and that perhaps a better alternative would be to confine the copyright owner to the right to
distribute copies to the public).
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use determinations; and (6) measures designed to increase the predictability
of these determinations. Part V concludes by arguing that although many of
these reforms are desirable in moderation, their selective adoption may not
bring about substantial improvements to the current system. Absent more
fundamental reform of the copyright system, the risk of copyright
overenforcement remains a serious and intractable one.
II. A

MODEL OF FAIR USE

The best place to begin is with a model of fair use-that is, of the
policies it is intended to serve, as opposed to a wooden restatement of the
standard fair use factors. 6 The model assumes that copyright in general gives

6.
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 115 (2003) (criticizing the four-factor approach); Patry & Posner,
supra note 1, at 1644-45 (similar). For the record, the four factors are set forth in Copyright Act
section 107, which states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work;
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). With respect to the first factor, evidence that the use serves one of the
listed purposes (e.g., for criticism or commentary), is noncommercial, or is transformative, is
said to weigh in favor of fair use. See Thomas F. Cotter, Gutenberg's Legacy: Copyright, Censorship,
and Religious Pluralism,91 CAL. L. REv. 323, 371 (2003) (providing citations). With respect to the
second, the fact that the work is fictional or unpublished weighs against fair use. See id. at 37677. With respect to the third, the more the defendant appropriated, in either a quantitative or
qualitative sense, the less likely the use is fair; the overriding question behind the third factor is
whether the defendant took more than was necessary to achieve its end. See id. at 378. And with
respect to the fourth factor, courts are directed to consider whether the use, if widespread,
would deprive the copyright owner of substantial licensing revenue. See id. at 379. Occasionally
courts consider other factors as well, such as whether the defendant acted in bad faith or,
alternatively, first sought a license from the owner. See id. at 371. The extent to which courts
actually rely upon the factors, as opposed to citing them as post-hoc rationalizations for what
they perceive to be correct results, is an ongoing question. See David Nimmer, "Fairestof Them
All" and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 281-82 (2003) (arguing
that "[c]ourts tend first to make ajudgment that the ultimate disposition is fair use or unfair
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rise to net social benefits, either by encouraging the production and
distribution of new works of authorship or by conferring social recognition
upon the labor and artistic judgment that goes into the act of authorship (or
both). The premise that copyright in general gives rise to net social benefits
in turn may support a general rule that users who would like to copy or
adapt copyrighted expression should negotiate with copyright owners for
permission. When the value a potential user (U) expects to derive from a
use (call this V1 ) exceeds the value the owner (0) accords to excluding that
use (call this Vo)-that is, when V, > Vo-a straightforward application of
the Coase Theorem suggests that U and 0 will strike a bargain under which
0 will permit the use for a fee, absent transaction costs or other bargaining
obstacles. Alternatively, when 0 values exclusion more than U values usethat is, when Vo > V 0-no bargain will be struck and the use will not occur,
or if it does, it will be deemed infringing, and a court will enjoin U and
award damages. This result is optimal as long as the central assumptions
underlying copyright are valid-that copyright entitlements in general
confer a net social benefit and that V, captures all or most of the social value
of the use. Further analysis indicates, however, that users should be free to
make unauthorized uses of copyrighted works in at least two instances.
A.

THE TRANSACTION-COST RATIONALE

Initially, U should be permitted to engage in unauthorized use in cases
in which the transaction costs of bargaining for use discourage U from
seeking permission, despite the fact that, in a transaction-cost-free world, V"
would exceed V0 . In other words, TCu > V u > Vo, where TC, denotes U's
expected cost of negotiating for the use. 7 In the absence of fair use (or some
other exception that would permit unauthorized use), the short-run result is
that U will either (1) forgo the use or (2) infringe.8 Forgoing use, however,
use, and then align the four factors to fit that result as best they can" and that "it is largely a
fairy tale to conclude that the four factors determine resolution of concrete fair use cases");
Patry & Posner, supra note 1, at 1645 ("All section 107 really amounts to in practical terms is
confirmation that the courts are entitled to allow in the name of fair use a certain undefined
amount of unauthorized copying from copyrighted works."). But see Barton Beebe, An Empirical
Study of the U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 590-91 (2008)
(disagreeing with Nimmer's assertion that "the factors 'tend to degenerate into post-hoc
rationales for antecedent conclusions'") (quoting 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05, at 13-206 (2007)). If nothing else, the malleability of the factors
can lead to unpredictable results. See Nimmer, supra, at 287.
7. For simplicity, we can assume that the value to the owner of excluding the use is the
net of the owner's cost of negotiating with the user. The transaction-cost rationale also would
appear to be implicated when V. > V0 > Vu - TC0 . It may be quite difficult for U to predict,
however, when these latter conditions are present.
8. But see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 117 (noting that some would-be users of
small portions of a work might purchase a copy of the entire work, even if fair use did not
excuse the use; even so, the transaction cost "would be very high: it would be the difference
between the price of the book and the value to the copier of the chapter that he copied").
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is Pareto-inferior to unauthorized use, insofar as neither party is better off,
and U is worse off, than in the case in which unauthorized use is permitted.
O receives no royalty in either case, and he would have consented to the use
in a transaction-cost-free world. Infringement in this type of case therefore
might appear preferable to nonuse, insofar as infringement would have no
negative ex ante impact on the incentive to create and publish (0 is no
worse off, remember), and U is better off. Once 0 discovers the use,
however, he will be able, assuming that copyright rights are normally
enforceable by injunctive relief and that no liability exception applies, 9 to
exercise his right to exclude U by means of an injunction. At this point, the
parties may well bargain to agreement since, by hypothesis, U values the use
more than 0 does, and transaction costs ex post may be lower than
transaction costs ex ante. (For example, ex ante, U may have had no
practical way of discovering who, if anyone, owned title to a so-called
"orphan" work.10 Ex post, if U's use comes to the attention of 0, that
problem is solved.) Even so, litigation itself imposes costs upon both parties
and society as well. Parties could avoid these costs if unauthorized uses were
permissible ex ante. In addition, a rule permitting unauthorized use
economizes on the transaction cost of having to negotiate for permission
and avoids any potential for strategic behavior or other obstacles that may
hold up or deter a productive use. A rule permitting U's unauthorized use
therefore is superior to a rule that permits 0 to enjoin the use in cases in
which TCu> Vu > V0 .
Even so, this model does not indicate that fair use is the only, or even
the best, response to the transaction-cost problem. For one thing, there is
always a risk of error, i.e., that courts will be unable to distinguish, at
justifiable cost, cases in which TCu > V, > V o from cases in which Vo > V, or
V u > TC u > V0 . There is also a risk that permitting fair use in hightransaction-cost settings may discourage private actors from coming up with
effective solutions for lowering transaction costs.11 Indeed, if fair use applies
only in cases in which transaction costs are high, one might envision an ideal
world in 12which transaction costs are reduced to zero, and fair use itself
vanishes.

9.
10.

See infra notes 13-16 and accompanying text; see also infra Part [VA.
See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 5

(2006) [hereinafter ORPHAN WORKS], available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphanreport-full.pdf.
11.

See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and

Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1295-96 (1996).
12.
See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on
Copyright's FairUse Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REv. 557, 579-80 (1998). But seejulie E. Cohen, Lochner
in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management, "97 MICH. L. REv. 462, 475-559
(1998) (disputing Bell's thesis).
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Moreover, nothing in the model suggests that 0 must always have a
right to enjoin U's use. Protecting O's copyright by means of a liability rule,
which permits U to infringe and pay damages only-either on a case-by-case
basis or pursuant to a compulsory licensing scheme-may sometimes be
preferable to protecting the copyright by means of a property rule within
the shadow of which the parties can bargain to their own solution. For the
most part, intellectual property law in general and copyright in particular
shun the use of compulsory licenses out of concerns that courts or other
governmental actors lack the information necessary to determine the proper
amount of the fee, and these actors may undervalue O's entitlement and
undermine the incentive scheme. Additionally, compulsory licensing itself
may discourage the private sector from developing superior transaction-costreducing institutions. 13 U.S. copyright law, nevertheless, permits compulsory

licensing in several discrete situations in which transaction costs are likely to
be high, 4 and perhaps one could argue in favor of an expanded role for
compulsory licensing notwithstanding its potential drawbacks.1 5 For now,
note only that fair use itself can be characterized as a type of compulsory
licensing system, albeit one in which the cost of the "license" is zero. In
theory, the fair use solution would be preferable to compulsory licensing for
a price above zero whenever the allocable social costs of compulsory
licensing would exceed the value to the individual user. For example, a
compulsory licensing system that imposed a cost of $10 upon a given
transaction (whether payable by the parties or by society generally) would be
inefficient whenever V, though greater than Vo , is less than $10.16
13.

See ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTrER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND

LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 38-41 (2005). Perhaps these concerns can be

exaggerated, however, particularly if liability rules have other virtues in comparison with
property rules in a given context. See IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAw: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL
ENTITLEMENTS 133-35 (2005). I thank Rob Merges for directing my attention to Ayres's
discussion of this point, and I note that Gibson also cites Ayres for the same point. See Gibson,
supra note 1, at 945 n.249.
14. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3) (2000) (authorizing owners of derivative works based on
.restored works," as defined by 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6), to continue using derivative works upon
payment of reasonable compensation); id. § 111(c) (providing for compulsory licensing for
secondary transmissions by cable systems); id. §§ 112(e), 114(d)(2), (f) (providing for
compulsory licensing of copyrights in sound recordings for use in digital transmission
subscription services); id. § 115 (providing for compulsory licensing of musical compositions for
use in phonorecords); id. § 116(c) (providing for arbitration of disputes between owners of
copyrights to musical compositions and jukebox operators, in the event that negotiations fail);
id. § 118 (providing for compulsory licensing of works for use by public broadcasting entities);
id. § 119(a) (providing for compulsory licensing for satellite retransmissions); id. § 122(a)
(providing for compulsory licensing for secondary transmissions by satellite carriers); id. §
405(b) (authorizing the court to allow an infringer to continue using work upon payment of
reasonable license fee, in certain cases involving innocent infringement).
15. See infra Part W.A.
16. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 116. There may also be instances in which a rule
that required payment as a condition of use would degrade the value of the use or have other
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THE POSITIVE-EXTERNALITIES RATIONALE

The other setting in which fair use should apply arises when the social
value of the use (Vs) exceeds the amount by which 0 values preventing the
use (Vo), which in turn exceeds U's expected value from the use (V1 ); that
is, V, > V o > V,. One might view this situation as involving a special type of
transaction-cost problem, because if transaction costs were zero, all of the
members of society who valued the use (including U, whose individual value
V U makes up part, but only part, of Vs) could band together and reach an
agreement to pay 0 some amount in between V o and V s.This perspective
might seem a bit myopic, however, depending on just how one interprets
social value. Social value might include, for example, the value of permitting
someone to respond to criticism by quoting the critic's words back at him
for purposes of effectively refuting him. In such a case, Wendy Gordon has
argued, the use is justified, rather than excused, and a rule that required any
payment should be rejected on normative grounds.' 7 Furthermore, value
itself can be defined in different ways. Economic analysis typically relies
upon revealed preferences-that is, the amount one is willing to pay
("WTP") to acquire a good or the amount one is willing to accept ("WTA")
to part with it-to define value, but this choice can be problematic. For one
thing, experimental evidence suggests that WTA sometimes exceeds WTP, in
which case one must determine which measure better reflects the amount
the individual values the good.'8 For another, the use of WTP and WTA is
premised on the assumption that the amount by which one values a given
thing is commensurable in money. WTP, moreover, depends to some

negative consequences. For example, Wendy Gordon has argued that more widespread use of
liability rules in copyright would (1) enable "industry lobbyists more easily [to] argue in favor of

even greater copyright extensions" and (2) potentially undermine the creative process. Wendy
J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been Only
Part of the Story, 50J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 149, 194 (2003) [hereinafter, Gordon, Excuse and
Justification]. Apropos of the latter, Gordon suggests that "[i]f... an author could only expect
money, her perception of her task-and the quality of what she produces-could degrade," and
in addition that "a requirement of ubiquitous payment may erode everyone's sense of
indebtedness to the community" by promoting "the illusion that we are not net recipients." Id.
at 195, 196. Gordon expands upon the degradation point in WendyJ. Gordon, Render Copyright
unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 78, 87-89 (2004) [hereinafter
Gordon, Incentives] (defending the thesis that "imposing a duty to pay for use might in

particular be inappropriate for .. .persons who are peculiarly well placed to be motivated by
perceptions of gift because they have a personal relationship to the text").
17. See Gordon, Excuse andJustification,supranote 16, at 154.

18.

For a good summary of the literature on endowment effects and related phenomena,

see Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1232-42
(2003). For a more recent, skeptical assessment, see Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The
Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, the "Endowment Effect," Subject Misconceptions, and
Experimental Proceduresfor Eliciting Valuations,95 AM. ECON. REV. 530, 531-32 (2005).
19.
See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and ContractDefault Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
608, 654 (1998).
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extent on one's ability to pay and thus might seem only a rough proxy for
utility (as well as ethically troubling, under some circumstances, to boot). 20
The conclusion that V, > Vo > V, in a given setting, therefore, might reflect a
collective judgment that social welfare is greater if a given use proceeds,
despite the fact
•21 that the individual user would not or could not pay the
owner's going rate.

Another way of restating the condition that V, > V0 > V--one that is
easier to integrate within the framework of mainstream economics-is that
the individual user's use gives rise to some spillover or positive externality,
which redounds to the benefit of third parties.22 Collectively these thirdparty benefits may exceed the amount 0 would be willing to accept to
consent to the use, but the amount any single user would be willing to pay
does not. Many of the possible manifestations of fair use specifically
referenced in section 107 of the Copyright Act, such as educational uses and
news reporting, may fall within this category. 3
Externalities, however, can take many forms, and many discrete
applications of fair use, including some that are typically thought of as being
rooted in other policies, can be viewed as falling within a broadly construed
externalities rationale. For example, it is often said that fair use permits brief
quotations for purposes of reviewing a literary or other work, because
reviews are a form of advertising, and this form of advertising is credible only
if author and publisher permissions are not required.24 Ex ante, authors and

20.

See Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 205,

229-30 (2004).
21.
Put another way, fair use may confer distributive benefits by exempting users from
having to pay for content in some situations in which ability to pay constrains willingness to pay.
See, e.g., Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1535,

1543-45 (2005). Another way of approaching the matter is to posit that the privatevalue (V,) of
some uses may exceed V., if some measure of utility other than willingness to pay applies-perhaps due to a normative judgment that permitting a particular use (say, a use for purposes
of self-defense) is appropriate, regardless of whether the owner objects. See Gordon, Excuse and
Justification, supra note 16, at 176-87.
Note also that the copyright owner is not necessarily the same as the author of the
work at issue. An author who has assigned her copyright to a publisher may prefer that the work
be widely quoted, but unless she has negotiated some residual rights in advance, she will have
no way of controlling her publisher's interest to the contrary. Thus, in some cases at least, the
author's interest in widespread dissemination may be part of Vs.
22. A static analysis would probably uncover more such positive externalities than would a
dynamic analysis that takes into account the possible negative effects of an overly expansive fair
use exception upon the ex ante incentive to create and publish. Ideally, policymakers should
take these potential dynamic effects into account as well, in determining whether on balance a
specific use is likely to give rise to positive externalities. This qualification makes the analysis
much more complicated, to say the least. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
24. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 6, at 117-18. If the quotation is longer than is
necessary to make the point, however, it threatens to supplant demand for the original, and is
therefore less likely to be fair use.
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publishers benefit from a system in which permission is not required, even
if, ex post, it might be in a specific author's or publisher's interest not to
grant consent to a specific reviewer. But this is just another way of stating
that the social benefit of the use is presumptively high, even when the value
to an individual copyright owner exceeds the value to the individual
reviewer. Moreover, one might perceive reviews and other forms of criticism
(including parodies) as giving rise to positive externalities even apart from
the interest of authors and publishers, to the extent they enable audiences
to decide in advance whether to consume certain works or affect their
appreciation thereof. Such information may well affect the market for the
work under review-perhaps negatively-but the readers' interest in
evaluating the quality of the work under review must be viewed as
outweighing the loss to the author. Any other view would almost surely give
rise to a conflict between copyright and the First Amendment guarantee of
freedom of speech.2"
Other examples of unauthorized uses that from time to time might
generate sufficient positive externalities to justify invocation of the fair use
doctrine are not hard to imagine. For example, suppose that an author
wishes to include quotations from multiple copyrighted works in the
author's own work. As Ben Depoorter and Francesco Parisi have shown, if
each of the quoted authors insists upon the profit-maximizing price for
permission, the collective fee demanded may outweigh the value of the use,
thus discouraging the use altogether.' 6 Alternatively, suppose that a
copyright owner objects to the temporary copying of its software code for
the purpose of reverse engineering the code so as to develop a
noninfringing complementary or competing product. The public interest in
competition may outweigh the value to both the copyright owner and to the
copier, thusjustifying a fair use right to reverse-engineer. 27
To be sure, as in the high-transaction-cost setting, fair use is only one
possible way of addressing a potential market failure, here due to the
presence of positive externalities. If users found a way to internalize all of
the positive externalities, for example, they would be willing to pay an
amount that exceeds Vo . Rules designed to increase the internalization of
25. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:A Structural and Market Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1631-32 (1982). More generally,
forbidding certain uses might inhibit the flow of ideas and thus undermine the purpose of
copyright itself. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Memes and Copyright, 80 TUL. L. REv. 331, 384-87
(2005).
26.
See Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory
Explanation, 21 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 453, 460-61 (2002).
27. See Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual Property Law, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 483, 541-44 (2006). For other examples of situations in which the public interest
in widespread access may weigh in favor of a finding of fair use, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley,
Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 188 n.15, 193-95
(2007).
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externalities, however, may at some point give rise to counterproductive
costs, as suggested in a recent article by Frischmann and Lemley.28 As
another option, society could decide to subsidize the posited social value in
other ways-as it already does to some extent through means like public
education. And, as in the transaction-cost setting, nothing thus far
necessarily leads to the conclusion that, when positive externalities are
present, copyright owners should never receive any compensation for the
use of their works. Although a compulsory licensing fee that equaled V o
would defeat the purpose of permitting unauthorized use under this second
class of cases, in theory a court could induce positive-externality-generated
uses to proceed even if it required U to pay some fee less than or equal to
V. Teasing out what this value is might not be worth the effort, however.
Moreover, as noted above, perhaps in some settings a rule requiring any
payment would itself exert a negative effect upon the ways in which people
value certain uses. 29
C. TRANSLATING THEORY INTO PRACTICE
The preceding theoretical discussion has elaborated upon two possible
rationales, consistent with the premise that copyright entitlements in
general produce net social benefits, for permitting unauthorized use of
copyrighted works in certain discrete cases. Some commonly-agreed-upon
applications of fair use in the real world seem to track the theoretical model
quite closely. For example, a teacher who photocopies a single article from
the morning newspaper for relevant classroom use later in the day almost
certainly has engaged in a fair use, whether the theoretical justification is
found in the transaction-cost rationale (it might be difficult to obtain
permission for such spontaneous use at any price, and the copyright owner
most likely would consent anyway) or the externalities rationale (because
education is a public good) . Translating theory into workable practical
standards, however, may not always be so easy. Reasonable minds may well
differ on the issue of whether transaction costs are sufficiently high, or
positive externalities sufficiently present, to justify the exercise of fair use in
many other cases. Courts and commentators have vigorously disagreed, for
example, about whether satire and burlesque, "critical engagements," and
reverse engineering of software should or should not count as fair use. 31
Moreover, since externalities are not directly measurable in any event, fair
28.
29.

See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 2, at 258.
See supra note 16.

30.
See AGREEMENT ON GUIDELINES FOR CLASSROOM COPYING IN NOT-FOR-PROFIT
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BOOKS AND PERIODICALS, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476,

at 68-70 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5681, 5681-88.
31.
For discussions of the contours of the debate, see Cotter, supra note 25, at 390-94
(discussing critical engagements, satire, and burlesque) and Cotter, supra note 27, at 541-44
(discussing reverse engineering of software).
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use tends to privilege certain uses (such as criticism and, its close cousin,
parody) as having high social value. In this sense, fair use may be closer
than it sometimes appears to the systems applied in some other countries,
which, lacking a fair use doctrine as such, include within their copyright
statutes a long list of specific permissible uses. 3 (Even with this caveat,
however, most commentators agree that fair use is broader and more
flexible than counterpart doctrines, such as the "fair dealing" exception,
found in some other countries' laws.34) Fair use therefore remains fairly
unpredictable and uncertain in many settings; as we shall see, this feature of
the doctrine has important implications for the analysis of copyright
overenforcement.
III.

THE DECISION TO USE (OR NOT)

Suppose that U, an author, wishes to reproduce or adapt a portion of
O's copyrighted expression. At the outset, U has three possible options.
First, she may seek out 0 and ask permission; assuming that 0 responds, 0
will either agree to the use (whether for a fee or not) or will decline. If 0
declines, U can either use-and risk detection and possible legal action-or
forgo use. Presumably, U's decision in light of O's rejection will be based
upon U's evaluation of the likely outcome if U decides to use without
permission. If U uses, she risks detection and possible legal action, which
may result in a judgment favorable to U, a judgment favorable to 0, or
settlement. If U does not use, she forgoes the value of the use to her but
avoids the potential negative consequences of litigation. Second, U might
decide to use without first contacting 0 (or to give up an unsuccessful
search to find 0). As above, U then risks detection and possible legal action,
which may result in a judgment favorable to U, a judgment favorable to 0,
or settlement. Third, U may decide to forgo the use before making contact
with 0, based upon her evaluation of the likely consequences of
unauthorized use.
More precisely, we can model U's decision as follows. U will decide to
engage in the unauthorized use of O's work when:

32.

The mere fact that one has engaged in such a use, however, does not give rise to a

legal presumption of fair use. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994).
33. Law No. 2003-517 of Aug. 1, 2003, Journal Officiel de laR~publique Fran4aise J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], Aug. 2, 2003, Art. L. 211-3, translated at http://195.83.177.9/
upl/pdf/code_35.pdf; Urheberrechtsgesetz [Copyright Law],July 16, 1998, pt. 1, ch. 6 (F.R.G.)
[hereinafter German Copyright Law], translated at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docsnew/pdf/

en/de/de080en.pdf.
34.

See Brian F. Fitzgerald, DigitalProperty: The Ultimate Boundary ?,7 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.

REv. 47, 94 (2001) (discussing commonwealth nations' fair dealing doctrine). At least one
recent Canadian case, however, interprets "fair dealing" in a manner that is somewhat closer to
fair use than has been apparent in other fair dealing cases. See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc'y
of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC 13 (Can.).
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(1) PAVU+ (1 -PA)[PF(Vu-

(1 -ac)C0 ) -(1

-PF)(CU+13Co+D+E)]

-R

U >O

where PA is U's subjective probability that 0 will acquiesce in the use; Vu is
the value that U expects to derive from the use; PF is U's subjective
probability that a court would rule that the use is fair; C u is U's expected cost
of litigating; a is the portion of C u that U expects to recover from 0 if U
prevails at trial, where 0 < a < 1; CO is U's subjective estimate of O's cost of
litigating; 3 is the portion of C. that U expects 0 will be awarded if 0
prevails at trial, where 0 _<0 < 1; D is the expected damages award if the
court rules in favor of 0; E is U's expected cost of complying with an
injunction if the court rules in favor of 0; and R, is U's risk premium, where
R > 0. 35 Realistically, U may not stop to think about all of the possible
contingencies. Additionally, she may have no idea, without first consulting
counsel, what value to accord some of the above variables. Nevertheless, to
the extent U attempts to make some type of rational evaluation of the likely
consequences of use, the variables presented above appear to include
everything that would be relevant to that evaluation.
U's subjective probability that 0 will acquiesce in the use (PA) depends
upon U's estimate of O's estimate of O's likely payoff if 0 proceeds to trial.
O's payoff can be modeled as follows:
- PF(aCU + CO) - Ro
(2) (1 - PF) (D + I -(1 13)CO)
-

where I is the value to 0 of obtaining an injunction forbidding U from
future use. 6 Note that D + I should equal Vo, O's expected value from the
use not occurring (assuming, that is, that all damages awarded are
collectable). Expression (2) therefore can be rewritten as:
(2a) (1 -

PF) (Vo

-

(1 - 3)Co) - PF(aCU, + Co) - Ro

Of course, the parties may differ in their estimates of all of these variables. 0
will file suit only if 0 believes that expression (2) is greater than zero; P, on

35. A risk-averse person, "when faced with a choice between two gambles with the same
expected value.., will choose the one with a smaller variability of return." WALTER NICHOLSON,
MICROECONOMIc THEORY 250 (5th ed. 1992). In the present context, a risk-averse litigant would
be willing to pay a risk premium R to "ensure an immediate payoff (or payout) below the
actuarial value of litigating to judgment." Thomas F. Cotter, Antitrust Implications of Patent
Settlements Involving Reverse Payments: Defending a Rebuttable Presumptionof Illegality in Light of Some
Recent Scholarship, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1069, 1073 (2004) (citing NICHOLSON, supra,at 250).
36. The value of an injunction would include the value of the future stream of royalties, if
any, from U, in the event the parties agree to a license subsequent to the entry ofjudgment and
also any positive effect on the value 0 can extract from other users-this value will diminish if
U prevails.
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the other hand, can be thought of as U's subjective probability that
expression (2) is less than zero.
Based on the analysis presented in Part II, we can derive a few
conclusions about the behaviors an ideal copyright system would induce.
First, the system would encourage U to use without permission-that is, to
conclude that expression (1) is greater than zero-whenever either TC0 > V,
> V o or V, > V o > V. Second, the system would encourage U to ask
permission whenever V u - TC u > V o.Third, the system would encourage U to
forgo use when V o > V s > VU. 3 7 We can also begin to consider what might

cause the system to diverge from the ideal and instead to produce perverse
outcomes, e.g., U forgoes use when TC 0 > V u > V, or V s > V, > V, or,
alternatively, U uses without permission despite the fact that V0 > V s.
The first point to note is that the "ideal" copyright system may be even
more difficult to achieve than one might first imagine. To illustrate, assume
(unrealistically) that the parties have perfect information, that both are risk
neutral, and that litigation is costless.3 Under the conditions stated,
expression (2) becomes (1 - PF) (D + I). In the extreme case, in which P,= 1,
expression (2) equals 0, and 0 will acquiesce. P,therefore equals 1, and the
left-hand side of expression (1) reduces to V u. U engages in the
unauthorized use of the work, as she should.
At any point at which PF < 1, however, O's expected payoff as expressed
in expression (2) is positive. This means that 0 is better off litigating than
acquiescing. Under these circumstances, P, is 0 and expression (1) reduces
to PFVu - (1 - PF)(D + E). U is better off settling for a fee F, ifVu - F > PFVu (1 - P,) (D + E), which can be restated as (1 - PF) (Vu + D + E) > F. Settlement

will be feasible, however, only if U's threat to use and risk provoking a
lawsuit is credible-that is, only if PFVu - (1 - PF) (D + E) > 0. Both parties will

be better off settling on terms that permit U to use, rather than litigating, if
there exists an F such that:

(3)

01-

PF) (VU+ D

+E)>F >(01-PF)(D +1)

Furthermore, if we make the plausible assumption that E < I-it should cost
less for the defendant to comply with an injunction than the value the
plaintiff expects to derive from the injunction, otherwise the defendant
should buy out the plaintiff's right to an injunction-then D + I = V o > D +
37. There may be forms of speech, such as threats or hate speech, that provide subjective
value to U but which reduce social wealth, that is, in which V u > Vs. With some exceptions, the
First Amendment largely precludes courts from comparing social and private utilities in this
fashion.
38. On these assumptions, Co, C, and R. are all zero. Note that, if the decisionmaker, like
the parties, has perfect information, then it knows whether TC, > Vu > V o or V s > V o > V. If the
parties are aware that the decisionmaker has perfect information, then PF equals either 0 or 1,
in which case U either forgoes use or uses without permission, respectively.
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E. D + E therefore can be restated as some fraction of Vo, that is, as xV o,
where 0 < x < 1, and expression (3) can be restated as follows:
(3a) (1 -P,)(VU+xVo)

>F> (1 -P)(Vo)

or
(3b) V 0> Vo(1 - x)
Referring to the ratio of U's value to O's value (Vo/Vo) by the arbitrary
symbol y, expression (3b) can be further restated as:
(3c) y> (1 - x)
If, on the other hand, y < (1 - x), no mutually agreeable settlement on
terms permitting U to use is possible. One possibility is that both parties will
choose to litigate instead-though if so, this is likely due to defects in the
available remedies. For example, suppose that P, = 0.75, V" = 100, V o = 200,
and x = 0.4. On these facts, y = 0.5 < 1 - x = 0.6, so settlement is not an

attractive option. U foresees a positive payoff of $55 if she litigates (i.e.,
expression (1) reduces to PFVU - (1 - PF)xVo or 0.75(100) - 0.25(80)). 0
foresees a positive payoff of $50 if he litigates (0.25(200)). 0 would accept a
fee of $50 or more to settle, but this would leave U with only $50 or less (100
- F), which is a worse outcome for U than litigating. U would pay no more
than $45 to settle. (Indeed, in the extreme case in which x = 0, settlement
will never occur when V0 > V0 ; y will always be < 1.) The problem is
attributable to the fact that x is too small. If x is set such that x > (V Vu)/Vo, the parties will always be better off settling than litigating. Thus, in
the preceding example, if x > 0.5, U foresees a payoff of no more than $50 if
she litigates, which makes settling for a $50 fee attractive.
An alternative outcome, depending on the values of the relevant
variables, is that U will forgo the use altogether. Recall that U will litigate
only if there is a positive payoff from doing so-that is, if PFVU - (1 P,) (xVo) > 0. Rearranging terms, this becomes y > (1 - PF)x/PF or, more

conveniently, y > ((1/P) - 1)x. U, therefore, will not litigate when:
(4) 7' < ((1/P,) - I)x

To illustrate, suppose that P, = 0.75 and x = 0.6. U will forgo use if y < 0.2;
that is, if 0 expects to derive more than five times as much value from U's
nonuse as U expects to derive from the use, even if the social value of the use
(Vs) exceeds Vo-as, here, it probably does, given the assumption that P, =
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0.75. 39 Put another way, in cases identical to this one, one would expect U to
prevail three times out of four; in fact, though, U will forgo the use every
time. Moreover, U's willingness to forgo use in some cases in which the fair
use conditions are present is attributable exclusively to the asymmetry of the
stakes: U simply has much less to gain than 0 has to lose. Note, however,
that if it were possible to substitute social value V, for Vu in the above
expressions (or if V, > Vo), y would always exceed 1. Hence, y also would
always exceed 1 - x, thus ensuring settlement in every case in which PrV, - (1
- P,) (xVo) > 0. This would align private and public benefits. The fact that U

would be paying for use in every case other than that in which PF = 1 merely
reflects the fact that the parties are bargaining in the shadow of the law.
Payment still might be problematic, however, if, as Gordon suggests, there
are circumstances in which payment for what appears to be a normatively
compelling use itself degrades the value of that use. 40
Another way of thinking about the matter, alluded to in Part I, is that
fair use may not adequately correct for a type of appropriability problem.
Most often, the term "appropriability problem" refers to the difficulty the
creator of a work of authorship (or an invention) faces in appropriating all
or even most of the social value of her creation. Once the work is released to
the public, the creator may fail to recoup that value, due to the nonrivalrous
nature of information and to the difficulties (given modern copying
technology) of excluding others from the work once it has been made
public. 4' Absent a corrective mechanism such as the institution of exclusive
rights (for example, a system of copyright), the assumption goes, this
problem will result in the underproduction of creative works.42 Potential
creators have no financial incentive, at any rate, to invest in the creation of
works that promise substantial social returns but will only yield private
returns that are less than the cost of the investment. (Of course, other
incentives, including the sheer pleasure of creating, might suffice to induce
creation and publication under some circumstances-for example, if the
author could independently finance the venture.) Interestingly, to the

39. For example, suppose that V,, = 100 and V. = 600. y = 1/6 < (4/3 - 1)x = 0.2, thus
deterring U from use. If U were to use without permission, her expected payoff would be

0.75(100) - 0.25(0.6) (600) = -15.
40. See Gordon, Excuse andJustification, supra note 16, at 154; Gordon, Incentives, supra note
16, at 87-89.
41.
See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
247, 247 (1994).
42. Even with the institution of exclusive rights, creators are unlikely to reap all of the
social benefit of their creations. An appropriability problem remains, albeit one of lesser
magnitude, and the production of new works may remain suboptimal. See, e.g., Yoo, Copyright
and Product Differentiation, supra note 1, at 256-57. Measures designed to increase creators'

ability to appropriate-to internalize the positive externalities of their work-nevertheless are
likely to be counterproductive after some point, due in part to excessive transaction costs. See
Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 2, at 277-79.
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extent the fair use doctrine is intended to permit unauthorized uses that
promise substantial social returns, it too suffers from an appropriability
problem (albeit one that has attracted far less notice in the relevant
literature than has the appropriability problem that is used to justify the
institution of copyright rights in the first instance). 43 The preceding analysis
suggests that, under some circumstances, would-be users are unlikely to
incur the risks associated with unauthorized use, even though the social
value of their use would exceed the harm to the copyright owner.4
That said, a few caveats are in order. The first is that it is difficult to
know for certain how many real-life cases exist in which asymmetric stakes
and lack of appropriability alone deter users from engaging in fair uses. The
answer to this question would depend in large part upon how frequently
social value due to positive externalities outweighs O's perceived value from
nonuse, which in turn must outweigh U's private value by a substantial
multiple. Second, under the simplifying assumptions employed thus far, fair
use underutilization does not appear to be a problem in the class of cases in
which fair use is justified due to high transaction costs, rather than because
of positive externalities. Realistically, the copyright owner probably never
detects the use in most of these cases. In those in which it does detect the
use after the fact, it could file suit but a settlement is likely in accordance
with expression (3c). By hypothesis, in these cases Vu > Vo and thus y > 1 > (1
- x). In the event settlement did not occur, U would prefer litigating to
conceding and forgoing continued use, as long as 7 > ((l/P,) - 1)x. This
condition is necessarily satisfied as long as P, exceeds 0.5 and at even lower
P, depending on the value of x.

43. As noted above, however, a few other commentators have spotted this issue before. See
generally sources cited supra note 2.
44.
In the model above, the private cost facing users was entirely dependent on the
probabilistic nature of the fair use determination. More predictable fair use standards reduce,
but do not eliminate, the problem, except in the extreme (and unrealistic) case in which PF

must be either 0 or 1. The presence of other private costs, including attorney's fees and risk
premia, exacerbate the problem.
In a recent paper, James Gibson suggests another reason why fair use rights may tend
to become narrower over time. See Gibson, supra note 1, at 898-900. Gibson argues that courts'
consideration of whether a market exists for licensing the type of use the defendant has made,
in connection with the fourth fair use factor, has a feedback effect. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. §
107(4) (2000) (directing courts to consider "the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work"). Specifically, if a risk-averse user seeks a license at time t,
even though a license may not seem necessary as a matter of fair use law, another user's
decision to bypass this licensing "market" at time t, may incline the court at time t, to conclude
that the use is not fair. See Gibson, supranote 1, at 898-900. In my view, to the extent the second
user relies on the transaction-cost rationale for fair use, this "tights accretion" makes sense: the
existence of a feasible licensing market at time t, may be evidence that the transaction costs of
licensing at time twere not insurmountable. To the extent the assertion of fair use relies on the
externalities rationale instead, however, the second user's bypassing of the licensing market
should not be dispositive.
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Once we factor into the analysis such variables as risk aversion, litigation
costs, and asymmetric information, however, the potential for fair use to be
underutilized becomes more substantial in both the positive-externalities
and transaction-costs cases. To illustrate, consider the extreme case in which
PF = 1, but PA = 0. In other words, 0 is certain to lose if the case proceeds to
trial, but is willing to proceed nonetheless. Expression (1) reduces to:
(5) Vu, - (I - ct) C,
Note that U's risk premium 45 R,= 0, since there is no risk: the outcome if the
case proceeds to trial is certain. U nevertheless forgoes use whenever (1 a)C U > V. In the extreme case in which a = 0 (meaning that each side
necessarily bears its own attorney's fees and costs), U forgoes use whenever
her expected fees and costs exceed the expected value of the use.
Alternatively, when a = 1, U uses with impunity. Realistically, however, even
in a system in which the losing party pays the prevailing party's fees as a
matter of course, these fees likely would not include the initial cost of
consulting with counsel prior to commencement of litigation about whether
the use is a fair use. Therefore, a will be < 1, and so even this initial cost
could deter U from use, depending on the magnitude of the relevant
variables.
Of course, the preceding example depended upon 0 being able to
convince U that 0 would sue even if the suit was a sure loser. Although this
may be possible in some instances, it is more likely that 0 can convey this
message when U perceives that PF < 1. As long as U perceives that PF < 1, U
realizes that it is possible for expression (2) to be positive; that is, that 0
foresees a positive payoff from litigating. More generally, recall that PA is U's
subjective probability that 0 will acquiesce. Thus:
(6) PA = f(Pr' D, I, (1 - P)C o , aC 0 , R.)

where increases in P, C., a, or Ro tend to increase the probability that 0 will
acquiesce, ceteris paribus, while decreases in any of these variables tend to
decrease the probability of acquiescence. Increases in D, I, 13,or C' also tend
to decrease the probability of acquiescence, at least for P, < 1, whereas
decreases have the opposite effect. 0 therefore has an incentive to signal to
U that PF, C., a, or Ro are relatively small and that D, I, 13,and C' are
relatively large.
With these additional factors taken into account, U may be deterred
from use even in a paradigm case of probable fair use, in which TC,> V, > V,
and PF is very high. Consider, for example, a situation in which U wants to
incorporate a paragraph from O's out-of-print book into U's own book; U is
45.

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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uncertain, however, whether O's book is still under copyright, does not
know where to contact 0, and does not know whether 0 still owns the
copyright. U estimates that the cost of uncovering this information will be
$1000 and that Vu is $100. Finally, U cannot know what Vo is but reasonably
concludes it is less than $100. U nevertheless cannot be absolutely sure of
the value of any of these variables or that a court would determine their
value with 100% accuracy; so rather than conclude that PF = 1, she proceeds
on the assumption that it P, is, say, 0.8. U might seem to be in the clear, but
she cannot completely rule out the possibility that 0 will detect her use ex
post, file suit, and hope to exploit U's vulnerable situation, having incurred
the cost of printing U's book. Depending on the values put into expression
(1), U might choose to forgo the use, even under these seemingly auspicious
circumstances.46
IV. Six DIFFERENT TYPES OF

REFORMS

We are now ready to consider the effects of different possible reforms
upon copyright enforcement and fair use. The following discussion
concentrates on six such reforms, but there are undoubtedly more. To the
extent that copyright overenforcement and fair use underutilization result
from appropriability problems, for example, virtually any measures designed
to increase users' ability to appropriate the social surplus of their uses would
reduce these problems to some degree, though they may have other
negative consequences.47 Or perhaps society should invest more in
educating users about their fair use rights and in providing users with pro
bono legal representation, as proposed by Heins and Beckles. 48 Doing so
would reduce some of the information asymmetry that may cause risk-averse
users in particular to avoid lawful uses of copyrighted works. What follows,
however, is a discussion of six specific types of reform to copyright law that
have been proposed or suggested, in one form or another, in recent
copyright cases and scholarship. The first reform involves substituting a
liability-rule entitlement for fair use, on the one hand, or for a property-rule
entitlement, on the other, in some class of cases. The second also involves
modifications to copyright remedies, specifically as they relate to damages

46. Suppose, for example, that U arbitrarily estimates that P, = P, = 0.8 and that a = 0.5,
13 = 0.25, Cu = C. = $5000, D = $500, and E = $500. U's expected payoff from unauthorized use =
-644 - R < 0, unless U is an extreme risk-lover. On these facts, U would forgo use because of the
small potential for incurring costs that are disproportionate to the value of the use; risk aversion
would make her even more likely to avoid the use.
47. Book reviewers, for example, already do capture some of the surplus generated by
their reviews to the extent the original portions of the reviews themselves are subject to
copyright protection. But it is unlikely they extract all of the value through typical pricing
mechanisms, insofar as one reader can pass ideas to one another with impunity and even
physical copies of the review can be redistributed after the lawful first sale.
48. See HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 1, at 57.
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liability in cases in which the defendant's use is not fair and the plaintiff is
entitled to injunctive relief (in addition, possibly, to damages). The third
involves the imposition of sanctions upon plaintiffs who persist in the face of
valid fair use defenses (or, for that matter, other defense entitlements). The
fourth involves modifying the rules relating to the recovery of attorney's
fees. The fifth involves measures designed to increase the accuracy of fair
use determinations, and the sixth involves measures designed to increase the
predictability of those determinations. I conclude that many of the measures
have merit, but that they are likely to have only limited effects on fair use.
A.

LIABILITY RULEs

Following the familiar Calabresi-Melamed framework, in the present
context I use the term "liability rule" to mean that the copyright owner is
entitled to recover monetary, but not injunctive, relief for copyright
infringement.49 Under a liability-rule system, the user has the option to
breach and pay damages. 50 Because the copyright owner cannot enjoin the
user from using, as long as the user pays the applicable amount of damages,
a liability-rule regime functions as a type of compulsory licensing system. As
noted above, Congress has authorized compulsory licensing of copyrighted
works in some discrete circumstances-typically those in which the
transaction costs of coordinating use among multiple users would be high,
as the Calabresi-Melamed framework predicts." For the most part, however,
the copyright regime protects those rights using a property-like entitlement,
meaning that upon a finding of infringement the owner usually succeeds in
obtaining an injunction (as well as damages
• • •
52 to compensate for losses
suffered prior to the entry of the injunction). The Supreme Court has
cautioned, however, that injunctive relief is discretionary; successful
copyright plaintiffs are not necessarily entitled to injunctive relief in every
case.5 3 But neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts have elaborated
much upon the circumstances under which courts may deny injunctive relief
54
in copyright cases.
49. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105-06 (1972); cf Dale A. Nance,
Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837, 870-71
(1997).

50.
51.

See Calabresi & Melamed, supranote 49, at 1105-06.
See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.

52.
53.

SeeBLAIR&COTTER, supra note 13, at 29-30.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,

Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837,
1840 (2006).
54. Following the Supreme Court's decision in eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), courts have
begun to apply the traditional four-factor test for determining whether to award injunctive
relief in patent and copyright actions. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (stating that, post-eBay, copyright owners may show
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One possible reform of the current fair use regime might be to
encourage courts to permit unauthorized uses to a greater extent than they
currently do, but subject the uses to the user's duty to pay compensation-in
effect, adopting a liability-rule regime for some class of unauthorized uses.
The suggestion that liability rules might play a useful role in responding to
the problem of copyright overenforcement might seem paradoxical, insofar
as the imposition of damages liability means that the plaintiff is entitled to
prevail. By definition, it would seem that if damages are the appropriate
legal response then the unauthorized use cannot be fair. But there is a
theoretical case to be made for the more widespread use of liability rules in
this context. Recall from the preceding Part that there is likely to be a class
of cases in which social value of the use (Vs) exceeds the amount by which 0
values preventing the use (Vo), which in turn exceeds U's expected value
from the use (V1 ); that is, Vs > Vo > V. In such cases, permitting the
unauthorized use to proceed would appear to maximize social wealth. But
there is a problem. Allowing an unauthorized use to proceed, without any
duty to compensate the copyright owner, threatens to undercut copyright

owners' incentives to produce, publish, or engage in other socially beneficial
activities in the first place.55 One can imagine, for example, cases in which
the decision to invest in producing a work would be negatively impacted by
the likelihood that courts would deem all or most of the expected uses fair
uses under a framework that finds fair use whenever Vs > V o > V".5 6 To be
irreparable harm based upon evidence such as of loss of market share, reputational harm, the
defendant's inability to pay a damages award, or the vulnerability of the plaintiff's works to
future infringement); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 439-44 (E.D. Tex.
2006) (concluding that the patentee was not entitled to injunctive relief because, inter alia, it
did not face irreparable harm from the loss of market share or brand-name recognition
attributable to Microsoft's inclusion of infringing software in its Windows operating system; the
infringing software was but a small component of the operating system; and Microsoft's inability
to use the infringing software pending a design-around would have left Windows itself
vulnerable to infringement). But even post-eBay there appear to be very few copyright cases in
which courts have declined to award the prevailing plaintiff injunctive relief. The only two cases
of which I am aware both involved the rather specialized world of architectural copyrights. See
Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 542-47 (4th Cir. 2007) (declining
to enjoin the defendant from selling or leasing infringing house, but ordering the return of
infringing plans); Allora, LLC v. Brownstone, Inc., Civ. No. 1:07CV87, 2007 WL 1246448, at *48 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2007) (declining to enjoin the defendant from completing three houses
already under construction, but enjoining the infringing use of the copyright in advertising).
Perhaps future courts will be less willing to award injunctive relief, however, in cases such as
Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), in which the plaintiff
obtained an injunction against the exhibition of an already released film, based upon the
defendant's having based three short scenes in the film on the plaintiff's drawing. It seems
unlikely that the plaintiff in Woods faced a loss of future market share or reputation, and the
plaintiffs work comprised but a small portion of the defendant's film. See id. at 65.
55. Conceivably, it also may reduce the incentive on the part of users to develop their own
institutions for internalizing externalities. See infra Part V.
56. Of course, one might resort to the same type of argument used above to justify fair use
in the context of high transaction costs-namely, that the copyright owner is no worse off if fair

1294

93 IOWA LA WREVIEW

[2008]

sure, policymakers might try to avoid this problem by acknowledging that
social value (Vs) includes the long-run value of having an effective copyright
incentive scheme in place. On this theory, V, never would exceed Vo under
circumstances in which fair use would substantially undermine socially
valuable incentives. Though hardly couched in these terms, the fair use
analysis in some real-world cases might be viewed as consistent with this sort
of analysis. 57 More generally, one might surmise that there would be many
more cases in which Vs, properly defined to include the social value of
preserving copyright incentives, exceeds Vo , which in turn exceeds Vu, if
users were obligated to pay owners something for the use of the work.
Requiring some payment, even if it is less than Vo , would undermine
copyright owner incentives less than requiring no payment and therefore
might result in more unauthorized uses going forward under the criterion
that V, > Vo > V,.
That said, the task of arranging matters such that the liability-rule
regime will increase social welfare is one that may not be easy to accomplish.
On the one hand, the payment (F) to be made by the prospective user
under such a system must be such that the use is still worth undertaking; that
is, V, - F - TC must exceed 0.58 On the other hand, the payment must be

use proceeds, because absent fair use the user will not succeed in bargaining for permission to
use the work. As long as Vo > Vu , U will not voluntarily pay 0 enough to induce 0 to relent. A
rule permitting U to use whenever the positive social externalities of the use exceed V o
nevertheless might have a greater likelihood of discouraging 0 from investing in creation and
publication ex ante than would a rule permitting unauthorized use when TCu > Vu > Vo; the
former rule might be more susceptible to erroneous application, if nothing else. If so, an overly
expansive fair use doctrine may undermine dynamic efficiency.
57. Consider, for example, the reverse-engineering cases. A finding of fair use is consistent
with the premise that the social value of competition (including the dynamic aspect of
competition, insofar as it encourages future innovation) exceeds both the private value to the
owner and the potential negative impact upon copyright incentives. This conclusion may well
be correct, particularly if network effects are present. See Cotter, supra note 27, at 530, 541-42.
The opposite premise, that the harm to socially valuable incentives exceeds the social value of
increased competition, would counsel against a finding of fair use (or other exemptions from
copyright liability). See id. at 542-44. In a related vein, in some instances fair use also may
frustrate copyright owners' efforts to price discriminate. Professor Picker presents a simple
thought experiment to illustrate the point. See Posting of Randal S. Picker to The University of
Chicago Law School Faculty Blog, More Google Print: Fair Use and Inefficient Bundling,
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2005/11/moregoogle-pri.html
(Nov. 11, 2005).
Whether this consequence is viewed as positive or a negative depends upon the welfare
consequences of price discrimination, which can be ambiguous. See Cotter, supra note 27, at
545-49 (citing sources).
58. Recall from the preceding Part that even when fair use does apply-i.e., the
compulsory licensing "fee" is effectively zero-U may sometimes forgo the use rather than
expose herself to even a small risk of liability. This risk may be even greater once attorney's fees
are factored into the analysis. See infta Part IV.D. The only reasons to adopt a liability-rule
regime, in light of this countervailing effect, is that doing so may expand the universe of cases
in which V. > Vo > V., even if it simultaneously places some unauthorized uses out of reach of
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large enough to preserve copyright owner incentives. Of course, any
payment less than Vo potentially weakens those incentives, though
conceivably only to a small (and therefore perhaps acceptable) extent.
In addition, one must take into account other potentially negative
consequences of liability rules. The liability-rule option increases the
administrative costs of the copyright system, for all of the reasons suggested
above in the discussion of compulsory licenses. Moreover, Gordon may be
right that a rule requiring compensation in all cases in which positive
externalities are present would either lead courts and legislatures to expand
the scope of copyright rights or distort the creative process by commodifying
acts of creative borrowing (or both). 60 And when the user has a strong
normative reason to engage in the unauthorized use, requiring payment
might be morally problematic, even if aS •rule61permitting uncompensated use
has a potential negative effect on incentives. In light of these obstacles, it is
not surprising that few courts to date have acted upon the Supreme Court's
suggestion that damages liability
may be a sufficient remedy for some classes
62
of copyright infringement.
Nevertheless, there are at least two types of cases in which a liability
regime conceivably might be an improvement over the current state of the
law. The first consists of cases in which the defendant wishes to make a
derivative work based upon the plaintiff's copyrighted work. Current law
provides the defendant with little bargaining power in such situations, even
63
if the derivative work is a radical improvement over the underlying work.
Application of the liability-rule option might encourage more uses that
promise high social value without unduly dissipating the incentive to invest
in the creation and publication of underlying works."4 This regime also
might resolve much of the tension between the owner's copyright rights and
the derivative-work author's First Amendment interest in freedom of
speech. 6 1 Indeed, adoption of the liability-rule option for unauthorized

some users and may render outcomes more predictable and, consequently, more affordable for

some users.
59. See supra text accompanying note 13.
60. See supra note 16.
61.
See Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 16, at 188 (citing Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Copyright and a DemocraticCivil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 330-31 (1996)).

62. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
63. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L.
REv. 989, 1063-65 (1997).
64. See Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1197, 121516 (1996) (arguing that the right to prepare derivative works typically does not provide a strong
incentive for the creation of new works).
65. See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REv. 891, 899-904
(2002); Hon. Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What's So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J.
Soc'Y U.S.A. 513, 521-23 (1999); John Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative
Use, Free Speech and an Intermediate Liability Proposal 2005 BYU L. REV. 1201, 1226-27; see also

COPYRIGHT

1296

93 IOWA LA WREVIEW

[2008]

derivative works might go a long way, by itself, toward solving the
overenforcement
problem.
But
there
are
some
substantial
counterarguments to 'onsider. Encouraging users to create unauthorized
derivative works, subject to a duty to pay damages, might not affect the
incentive to create most types of underlying works, 66 but it could have an
impact on some works, particularly works of entertainment that are expected
to generate substantial spinoff revenue. 67 And there may be other reasons
why according copyright owners the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works may be beneficial, including the reduction of congestion externalities
and other coordination problems68 and concern over copyright owners'

Lemley, supra note 27, at 192-93 & n.46 (arguing that, in cases involving transformative but
non-fair uses, providing copyright owners with appropriate compensation, but not control over
the infringing work, would avoid enjoining the publication of inseparable, noninfringing
material); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of FairUse in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1177, 1203 (2000) (arguing in favor of a patent fair use doctrine, under which fair users would
be required to pay compensation); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
Constitutionality,112 YALE L.J. 1, 16-21 (2002) (arguing that according copyright owners a right
to recover the derivative author's profits attributable to the underlying work would be
consistent with the First Amendment, but that compensatory damages and injunctive relief are
not).
66. See Sterk, supra note 64, at 1216.
67. See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5.3, at 5:81 (2002). The normative question of
whether encouraging such spinoffs is good or bad policy depends upon one's vision of the good
society. See Cotter, supra note 25, at 398-401. In addition, permitting the unauthorized creation
of derivative works that might substitute for the underlying work would tend to undermine
incentives to produce underlying works. To the extent a derivative work transforms the
underlying work, the substitution effect is reduced but perhaps not eliminated altogether. See
Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 2002).
68. In theory, if too many users want to prepare derivative works based upon the same
underlying work, the market for such derivative works may become prematurely sattrated,
leaving consumers worse off than they would be if the owner of the underlying work could
coordinate production of derivative works. For example, the first film version on a novel may
exhaust public demand for a second film version (for a time, at least), even if the first film is of
lower quality than some hypothetical authorized alternative version would have been. Or
perhaps no one will invest in making a film version out of fear that other versions that may be in
the works will divide the market so that no one makes a profit. An exclusive right to prepare
derivative works may increase social wealth by preventing the negative effects of such copyright
races-but the evidence is far from clear. Theoretical and empirical studies of the analogous
phenomenon of patent races point in different directions. See BLAIR & COTrER, supra note 13, at
112-13. And one can certainly come up with anecdotal evidence (e.g., the spate ofJane Austeninspired films and television programs in the late 1990s) to the contrary. Indeed, some
commentators have argued that a principal virtue of the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works is that it suppresses what would otherwise be excessive competition among similar
derivative works. See generally Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright's Derivative Right and
Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REv. 317 (2005). Perhaps the most one can say with confidence is
that an exclusive right to prepare derivative works is most likely to be welfare-enhancing when
the derivative work at issue is one that requires large fixed costs (such as a feature-length
movie) and for which demand is relatively finite.
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"moral rights." 69 Under the liability-rule option, there also would be some
increase in litigation costs devoted to the issue of whether a given use adapts
or transforms the underlying work or merely copies it. Ultimately, the
question of whether to adopt a liability rule in the case of unauthorized
derivative works comes down to how much weight to accord the intangible
First Amendment interest in permitting users to express themselves through
the adaptation of others' expressive works; the more salient that interest
appears to be, the less relevant the potential negative consequences appear.
In the near term, however, the odds of this rule being widely adopted
appear (to me, at least) to be small.
The second class, consisting of cases in which copyright owners refuse
to license the reproduction of their works for political, ideological, or
religious reasons, may be a more feasible candidate for the liability-rule
solution. To illustrate, consider the facts of Worldwide Church of God v.
PhiladelphiaChurch of God, Inc.,y7 a case that I have previously written about at
some length .7 A religious organization that owned the copyright to a work it
no longer believed to be divine revelation refused to license the text's republication to a breakaway sect that intended to use the work for religious
72
purposes, including proselytization.
The refusal to license may have

69. A translation, for example, is a type of derivative work. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp.
2005) (defining a "derivative work"). A translation that inaccurately communicates the message
intended by the author of an underlying work could be viewed as undermining the integrity of
the underlying work, see MILAN KUNDERA, TESTAMENTS BETRAYED: AN ESSAY IN NINE PARTS 10120 (Linda Asher trans., 1995), and the exclusive right to prepare derivative works as vindicating
interests similar to those that are the subject of moral rights laws in other countries. See Thomas
F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1, 1 (1997). Kundera
himself no longer permits translations into his native Czech of the more recent work he has
authored in French. SeeJacques M6litz, English-Language Dominance, Literature, and Welfare (Ctr.
for Research in Econ. & Statistics ("CREST"), Working Paper, Apr. 2000), available at http://
www.crest.fr/pageperso/melitz/litlOO.htm; see also Laura R. Bradford, Parody and Perception:
Using Cognitive Research to Expand FairUse in Copyright, 46 B.C. L. REv. 705, 756 (2005) ("[W]orks
themselves may be less desirable for consumption if their meanings are altered.").
70. Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir.

2000).
71. See Cotter, supra note 6, at 364-86. In a recent paper, Mark Lemley presents an
interesting argument that, in cases in which the copyright plaintiff successfully asserts that a use
is not fair because the defendant could have paid for and obtained a license from the plaintiff,
the defendant should be permitted to continue the use upon payment of the licensing fee. See
Lemley, supra note 27, at 195. A plaintiffs dissatisfaction with this result would suggest that the
plaintiff's opposition to the use is "a front for what is really an interest in forbidding the use and
foregoing licensing revenue." Id. To the extent that a successful assertion of the fair use defense
turns on the feasibility of licensing ex ante, this suggestion makes sense if, as Lemley asserts, "it
is a simple exercise for a court to assess damages in such a case." Id. The extent to which other
considerations, however, including the social value of the use and the validity of the plaintiff's
interest, if any, in moral-rights-like protection, see id. at 195 n.65, are relevant, the substitution
of a liability for a property rule presents further, though perhaps not insurmountable,
difficulties. See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
72. See Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1113.
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significantly affected the defendant's ability to practice its religion, assuming
that in the minds of its believers no paraphrased text would be an adequate
substitute for the original . And yet a judgment declaring the defendant's
use to be fair might be problematic, given that the defendant intended to
make and distribute thousands of copies of the original in its entirety; were
the copyright owner to have another change of heart at some point down
the road, it might find the market for the work exhausted by the defendant's
copies. In such a case, therefore, a liability rule might be preferable to either
fair use or no use, insofar as it permits the user to exercise its rights to free
speech and religion while still preserving some degree of copyright
protection for the owner. Similar cases might arise whenever a defendant
has a compelling need to access a specific text in order to make its point
most effectively. 74 But the number of such cases is likely to be small. Some
cases that might seem to fall within this fact pattern at first blush may not
appear so promising upon further reflection. 75 Moreover, routine inquiry
into copyright-owner motives in every case would be intrusive and, in most
circumstances, unnecessarily costly, given that access to a work's underlying
ideas as expressed in a paraphrase should suffice in most instances.
Nevertheless, courts should consider applying liability rules in the small class
of cases in which copyright owners threaten to turn the copyright system on
its head by using copyright as a tool of censorship rather than for promoting
robust debate.

73. See Cotter, supra note 6, at 360-62 (providing examples).
74. One might think of such cases as involving "partial merger." The merger doctrine
states that copyright protection does not subsist when the ideas in a given work merge with its
expression; that is, when there is only one way or a small number of ways of expressing those
ideas. See, e.g., Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 1986). As stated, the
doctrine obscured several normative issues, such as what "counts" as an idea and how many ways
of expressing it are "small." But one thing that does seem reasonably clear is that courts apply
the doctrine only when the need to access the text in haec verba is (more or less) universal. The
doctrine does not apply when most users could get by with a paraphrase, even though for some
class of users access to the exact text is necessary. See Cotter, supra note 25, at 386-87. In this
type of case, courts should consider accommodating the latter class through fair use or, perhaps
better, by means of a liability rule.
75. Consider, for example, the decision by the National Science Association and the
National Science Teachers Association to refuse permission to the State of Kansas to include its
science education standard manuals in the state science curriculum after the state authorized
the teaching of intelligent design theory as an alternative to evolution. See Jennifer Granick,
Evolutionists Are Wrong!, WIRED NEWS, Nov. 9, 2005, http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,
69512,00.html. Granick describes intelligent design theory as "junk," but she also characterizes
the refusal to license as akin to other efforts by copyright owners to "squelch speech" and
suggests the possible applicability of copyright misuse. See id. In my view, however, neither fair
use nor the misuse doctrine should condemn the refusal to license in this instance, absent
evidence that the state is unable to obtain adequate substitutes from other sources or to create
its own-a matter that Granick's discussion does not touch upon. Otherwise copyright
entitlements become indistinguishable from compulsory licenses.
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Another possibility would simply be for courts to weigh the equities of
injunctive relief on a case-by-case basis, as the Supreme Court instructs them
to do in the context of patent-infringement suits. 76 This may be a desirable
rule, but unless the courts begin denying injunctive relief frequently enough
that the cases begin to sort themselves out with some predictability, it may
have little impact on users' ex ante decisions to use or to refrain from use.
Thus, despite its theoretical attractiveness, the liability-rule option may wind
up playing only a limited role in freeing socially beneficial unauthorized
uses from copyright-owner control.
B.

DAMAGES

A second set of possible reforms involves modifying some aspects of
damages law so as to encourage more defendants to assert the fair use
defense. Heins and Beckles, for example, propose that "the law should not
impose money liability on anybody who reasonably believed her copying was
fair," that is, "to eliminate money damages against anybody who reasonably
guesses wrong about a fair use or free expression defense." 77 (Presumably,
the unsuccessful defendant would still be enjoined from future
infringement.) Heins and Beckles's use of the word "reasonably" suggests
some sort of objective good-faith standard (i.e., that the user had reason to
believe that PF was relatively high), though in theory one could apply a
subjective standard (e.g., that U believed, innocently but incorrectly, her use
to be fair) or some combination of the two. Either alternative would require
further elaboration, however. For example, does U act in subjective good
faith if she conducts no pre-use investigation of applicable law? If not, how
much investigation
is necessary? If the standard is objective good faith, how
78
high must PF be?
Assuming that the details are worked out, the effect of the Heins and
Beckles recommendation would eliminate the variable D from expressions
(1) and (2) in an appropriate case, thus marginally encouraging U to
engage in unauthorized use and 0 to acquiesce. But the effect would likely
be attenuated in many cases. In terms of expression (1), the impact
increases U's expected payoff only in the amount of (1 - PA) (1 - PF)D. If PF

must exceed some critical level-say, 0.30-for the use to be deemed good
faith, and if PA is (as suggested above) in part a function of PF, the impact of
the rule is doubly muted. On the arbitrary, but not implausible, assumption
that P, and PF both equal 0.50, for example, the effect of the rule increases

76. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006); see also supranotes
53-54 and accompanying text.
77. HEINS & BECKLES, supranote 1, at 56, 57.
78. Heins and Beckles suggest their proposal would be an extension of 17 U.S.C. §
504(c) (2) (2000), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 79-81. See HEINS & BECKLES, supra
note 1, at 58 n.31.
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U's payoff by only 0.25D. Of course, if D is high enough, even a sliver of D
can be large in absolute terms. Statutory damages for nonwillful copyright
infringement, after all, can range from $750 to $30,000 for each work
infringed.79 On the other hand, reducing the copyright owner's projected
payoff in the amount of (1 - PF)D could conceivably have a negative impact
on incentives-though again, if the reduction kicks in only when P, is
relatively high, and accordingly (1 - P,)D is relatively low, ex ante, the
impact on incentives is likely to be minimal too. The reduction or
elimination of statutory damages, if not all damages, in cases involving goodfaith fair use defenses therefore might constitute a (moderately) useful
reform. It also would not entail a radical rewrite of the Act. As Heins and
Beckles note, the Act already exempts nonprofit educational institutions,
libraries, and archives from liability for statutory damages for the good-faith,
but unsuccessful, assertion of fair use. s° This exemption could be extended
to other users. 81

79. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). For willful infringement, the upper amount can be as high
as $150,000. See id. § 504(c)(2) (first sentence). Where the "infringer sustains the burden of
proving... that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts
constituted an infringement of copyright, the court . . . may reduce the award of statutory
damages to a sum of not less than $200." Id. (second sentence). Given the difficulty of proving
actual damages in the form of lost profits or royalties, or defendant's profits attributable to the
infringement, it is possible (though by no means certain) that awards of statutory damages are
necessary to preserve the copyright incentive scheme (i.e., to ensure that copyright owners
ultimately are no worse off as a result of having their works infringed). See BLAIR & COTrER,
supra note 13, at 74-83.
80.
See HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 1, at 58-59 n.31 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2) (third
sentence)). The third sentence of § 504(c) (2) also exempts public broadcasters from statutory
damages for public performances of nondramatic literary works and for reproductions of
transmission programs embodying performances of such works. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2) (third
sentence). There appear to be no reported decisions construing this sentence, though, as
Nimmer and Nimmer observe, the language appears to contemplate that the defendant's
conduct "must not only be in good faith, but must also be reasonable." 4 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 6, § 14.04[B] [2] [b], at 14-76 (2006). The House Report accompanying the 1976
Copyright Act also states, without explanation, that in applying this sentence "the burden of
proof with respect to the defendant's good faith should rest on the plaintiff." AGREEMENT ON
GUIDELINES FOR CLASSROOM COPYING IN NOT-FOR-PROFIT EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS WITH

RESPECT TO BOOKS AND PERIODICALS, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 163 (1976), reprinted in 1976

U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5779.
81. The Copyright Act also permits statutory damages to be reduced to as little as $200 in
cases in which the plaintiff omitted copyright notice from the work the defendant copied. See 17
U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (second sentence); id. § 401 (d) ("Ifa notice of copyright... appears on the
published copy or copies to which a defendant in a copyright infringement suit had access, then
no weight shall be given to such a defendant's interposition of a defense based on innocent
infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages, except as provided in the last
sentence of section 504(c)(2)." (emphasis added)). As noted supra at note 80 and
accompanying text, the last sentence of § 504(c) (2) extends an additional good-faith defense to
only a limited class of users. The Act also forbids statutory damages altogether, thus relegating
the plaintiff to the (usually) more uncertain realm of lost profits or restitutionary awards, when
the plaintiff fails to register his copyright within three months from the earlier of first
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SANCTIONS

Another possibility would be to discourage plaintiffs from asserting
copyright claims in the face of strong fair use defenses by imposing some
type of sanctions against plaintiffs (over and above attorney's fees) in such
cases. In terms of expression (2), one could add another variable S (for
sanction), such that O's decision to acquiesce depends upon whether:
(2b) (1 - PF)(D + I - (1 - 3)Co) - Pr(aCu + Co+ S) - Ro> 0

In theory, one might think of S as a sort of "reverse multiplier" intended to
deter invalid assertions of copyright rights. 82 For example, if one assumed

that 0 would succeed in deterring the assertion of a valid fair use defense
three times out of four, and that each successful deterrence by 0 brought
him $100 in profit, O's expected gain (abstracting from other costs) would
be $300. If on the one occasion in which 0 was unsuccessful in deterring the
fair use he would be assessed a $300 penalty, his expected gain ex ante
would be $0; he would no longer have an incentive to deter fair uses.
Realistically, however, it is difficult to perceive how a court could craft a
deterrent penalty with such precision.
But it may be possible to apply other doctrines as a rough proxy for
such a sanction. One possible proxy is copyright misuse. The misuse
doctrine originated in patent law, as an analogue to the common-law
doctrine of unclean hands. In the patent context, if the defendant in an
infringement case can prove that the patent owner has misused its patent by
"impermissibly broaden [ing] the 'physical or temporal scope' of the patent
grant with anticompetitive effect," the court renders the patent
unenforceable until the misuse is purged (that is, until its effects dissipate).8'
Several courts have applied the misuse doctrine in the copyright context as
well, holding unenforceable the copyrights that those courts deemed the

publication or infringement. See id. § 412; see also ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 10, at 115, 127
(recommending, inter alia, eliminating statutory damages for infringement of qualifying
orphan works).
82. Law-and-economics literature makes extensive use of the multiplier concept in the
context of damages awarded to plaintiffs. A common example is that of a defendant who
breaches a legal duty-thus conferring upon himself an illicit benefit, or causing the plaintiff
an unwanted harm, of $X. If the plaintiff detects the breach on average only 1/y of the times it
occurs, the optimal damages award is yX. An award of actual damages or restitution (X) would
provide no disincentive to commit the breach. For an overview of the literature, see Thomas F.
Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Enhanced Damages and Attorney's Fees for Willful Patent Infringement,
14 FED. CIR. B.J. 291, 308-14 (2004).
83. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971)). The case law is
surprisingly vague about exactly when purgation occurs. See, e.g., B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314
U.S. 495, 498 (1942); Preformed Line Prods. Co. v. Fanner Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 265, 279 (6th Cir.
1964).
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copyright holder to have used "in a manner violative of the public policy
embodied in the grant of a copyright."84 Interestingly, most decisions hold
that there is no standing requirement with respect to the misuse doctrine; in
other words, a defendant may raise the misuse defense even if the alleged
act of misuse did not affect the defendant itself.85 Perhaps the misuse

doctrine could play a more important role in preventing copyright owners
from overreaching-as even Judge Posner, a quondam critic of the misuse
doctrine, has come to believe. 6
In the present context, a finding of misuse can be thought of as a type
of penalty (S) equal to the value of the forgone revenue from exploitation of
the copyright until the misuse is purged-which the copyright owner will
incur in the set of cases in which its opposition to U's proposed use is
deemed to be sufficiently egregious. As P,

--

1, presumably, the probability

that O's opposition is in good faith declines. In practice, however,
application of the misuse doctrine to deter unwarranted opposition to fair
uses might be problematic. For one thing, hindsight bias might infect a
court's determination as to whether there was an ex ante good-faith basis for
0 to conclude that the use was not fair.17 For another, if S is too large, S may
have the unintended consequence of overdeterring legitimate exercises of
copyright rights. This hardly seems an idle possibility, given that a finding of
misuse renders the copyright unenforceable as to the entire world until the
misuse is purged.

84. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Alcatel
USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 783-84, 793-94 (5th Cir. 1999); Practice Mgmt.
Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 517-20 (9th Cir. 1997).
85. See Cotter, supra note 27, at 539-40. Critics, including myself, have questioned this
aspect of the misuse doctrine as well as the application of the doctrine in some of the case law.
See id.; Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REv. 901, 961-62 (2007); Mark A. Lemley,
Comment, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1614-20
(1990).
86. Compare Assessment Techs., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003),
with USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982). In Assessment Technologies,
Judge Posner stated:
The argument for applying copyright misuse beyond the bounds of antitrust.. . is
that for a copyright owner to use an infringement suit to obtain property
protection, here in data, that copyright law clearly does not confer, hoping to force
a settlement or achieve an outright victory over an opponent that may lack the
resources or the legal sophistication to resist effectively, is an abuse of process.
Assessment Technologies, 350 F.3d at 647. In his earlier opinion in USM Corp., Judge Posner
expressed more skeptical thoughts on misuse: "Our law is not rich in alternative concepts of
monopolistic abuse; and it is rather late in the day to try to develop one without in the process
subjecting the rights of patent holders to debilitating uncertainty." USM Corp., 694 F.2d at 512.
87. For empirical evidence of hindsight bias in patent law, see generally Gregory N.
Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent
DecisionsIrrational,67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006).
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A variety of reforms to the misuse doctrine nevertheless might
ameliorate some of these potential negative consequences. One option is to
institute a standing requirement, thus preventing courts from finding misuse
without receiving adequate input from the parties whom the challenged
88
In the present context, a standing
conduct most directly affects.
requirement would prevent a court from finding misuse based upon a
defendant's assertion that the plaintiff enforced its copyright too
aggressively with respect to some third party. Another option is to alter the
consequences of misuse. Kathryn Judge, for example, has argued that courts
could penalize misusing copyright owners by substituting liability
rule for property-rule protection, rather than by rendering copyrights
unenforceable. 89 In terms of expression (2), 0 would still suffer some
penalty S if its copyright effectively became subject to a compulsory license,
but it would be a lesser penalty than if 0 could not enforce the copyright at
all. Thus, this modified scheme might be less prone to overdeterring the
legitimate assertion of copyright rights. But even so, it is unlikely that courts
would find copyright misuse unless the assertion of rights is very weak, that
is, unless P, is quite high to begin with. A greater role for the misuse
doctrine may be salutary but, as suggested above, only an incremental
improvement over the current regime.
An alternative to applying the misuse doctrine might be to create some
new cause of action for the assertion of copyright rights in the face of a valid
fair use defense. In a related context, Jason Mazzone has argued in favor of
creating a civil cause of action for falsely claiming copyright in publicdomain works, which he analogizes to a form of false advertising. 90
Expanding this proposed new tort to cover cases in which the owner of a
valid copyright prevents a user from validly exercising her fair use rights
might seem logical, but in fact it would give rise to many problems. One is
administrative. Mazzone's proposal may be plausible in the context of false
assertions of copyright in public-domain works, because the issue of whether
a work has fallen into the public domain is usually easy to determine. 9' Fair
88.
89.
(2004).
90.

See Cotter, supra note 27, at 539-40; Cotter, supranote 85, at 961-62.
See Kathryn Judge, Note, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REv. 901, 950-51
SeeJason Mazzone, Copyftaud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1037-38 (2006).

91. This is not to say that it is always easy to determine whether a work is copyrightable.
Reasonable minds may differ on the question of whether a work manifests sufficient originality
with respect to expression, selection, or arrangement to qualify for copyright protection; or
whether the merger or scenes Afaire doctrine applies. And there can even be cases in which it is
unclear whether a copyrighted work has fallen into the public domain: for example, where it is
unclear whether the author forfeited his copyright by publishing his work prior to March 1,
1989, without copyright notice. What Mazzone rightly targets, however, is the assertion of
copyright in the entirety of a work that is clearly within the public domain based upon the
claimant's addition of some small amount of arguably copyrightable expression, selection, or
arrangement.
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use determinations, by contrast, are often quite difficult to predict, unless
the law moves in the direction of a more bright-line approach, as discussed
below. 9 Alternatively, if the new cause of action were limited to cases in
which the defendant's entitlement to use was sufficiently clear and onesided, it seems doubtful that the new tort would provide much additional
deterrent value beyond that which is already potentially available under the
misuse doctrine (as it currently exists or as suitably reformed) or the
standards relating to the recovery of attorney's fees. In effect, the new claim
would change misuse from an affirmative defense to an affirmative claim.
But who besides a copyright defendant would be likely to litigate an
affirmative claim for copyright misuse? A user who forgoes a use that clearly
would have been fair (and therefore is not a defendant in a copyrightinfringement suit) seems a singularly poor candidate for such a role. To
prove causation, she would have to show that the copyright owner dissuaded
her from the use but not from subsequently suing the copyright owner in
tort. In addition, to obtain a meaningful damages remedy, she would have to
present some nonspeculative basis for calculating the value of the forgone
use-no small feat in light of her earlier decision to forgo use in spite of (as
assumed) almost certain victory. Despite some superficial resemblance to
Mazzone's thoughtful proposal with respect to public-domain works,
creating a new tort for victims of false assertions of no fair use probably
would add little to the current mix of policies.93
D. A TTORNEY'S 1FES
Section 505 of the Copyright Act states that "the court may ... award a
reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs."

94

In

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., the Supreme Court construed this language to mean,
first, that in copyright cases courts should award attorney's fees in an evenhanded manner-rather than pursuant to a "dual standard" under which
prevailing plaintiffs presumptively are entitled to fee awards-but prevailing
defendants are awarded fees only when the plaintiffs claim is frivolous or in
bad faith. 95 Second, the Court interpreted the statute to mean that awards of
attorney's fees are discretionary, not automatic, in copyright litigation. 96 It
therefore rejected the argument that Congress intended to displace
completely the so-called American rule, under which each party bears its
92.
See infra Part IV.F.
93. Mazzone himself does not argue in favor of such a cause of action, but rather for
vesting a federal agency with authority to "investigat[e] patterns of interference with fair use
and bring[] actions to recover fines." Mazzone, supra note 90, at 1296. I confess to having
doubts that the proposed mandate would amount to a major priority for the federal
government, however.
94.
17 U.S.C. § 505 (2000).
95. Fogertyv. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994).

96.

Id.
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attorney's fees, with the English rule, under which the losing party is
required to pay the prevailing party's attorney's fees. 97 Instead, it suggested
that courts consider factors such as "'frivolousness, motivation, objective
unreasonableness ... and the need in particular circumstances to advance
considerations of compensation and deterrence.' 98 Subsequent decisions
from the lower federal courts focus largely on the objective good or bad
faith of the losing party. 99
At first glance, the analysis set forth in the preceding Part might seem to
suggest that adoption of either the American or the English rule would have
an ambiguous effect on fair use enforcement. Under the American rule, a =
3 = 0, so that U's expected payoff from unauthorized use reduces to PAVu +
(1 - PA) [PF(VU - Cu) - (1 - P,)(Cu + D + E)] - R, and O's payoff from
nonacquiescence reduces to (1 - P,) (D + I - C) - PFCo - R o . Each party

shoulders its own fees but incurs no risk of having to pay the other side's
fees in the event of a loss. Alternatively, under the English rule, a and 0
approach 1, though as noted above they are unlikely to actually equal 1. As a
and 0 approach 1, U's expected payoff approaches PAVu + (1 - PA) [PF(VU) (1 - P )(Cu+ C, + D + E)] - R, and O's approaches (1 - P,)(D + I - Co) PF(CU + C) - R.

A more careful analysis, however, suggests some nuances. One strength
of the American rule is that it encourages parties who can finance their own
fees to vindicate their perceived rights. Among its potential weaknesses,
however, is that it discourages litigation when the individual stakes of
winning (for either plaintiff or defendant) are too small to justify the
expense. Discouraging litigation economizes on administrative costs but may
undermine important social policies if, for example, a victory for the party
that otherwise would have prevailed would have given rise to positive social
externalities.' 00 By contrast, the English rule may discourage the pursuit of

97.
98.
1986)).

Id.
Id. at 535 n.19 (quoting Lieb v. Topstone Indus. Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir.

99.

See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 680, § 14.10[D] [3] [b], at 14-203 to -204. As

Nimmer and Nimmer state:
Post-Fogerty cases awarding fees to prevailing defendants still tend to focus on the
plaintiff's bad faith motivation . . . , hard ball tactics . . . or objective
unreasonableness ....
Conversely, they tend to deny attorney's fees to prevailing

defendants when the plaintiffs claims were neither frivolous nor motivated by bad
faith. By the same token, there is typically no award of fees in cases involving issues
of first impression or advancing claims that were neither frivolous nor objectively
unreasonable.
Id.
100. Some defendants, for example, may settle rather than incur the cost of litigating a
nuisance suit to victory, thus encouraging other potential defendants to engage in compliance
beyond the level that the law requires. Alternatively, some plaintiffs may not bother to enforce
their rights, thus encouraging other potential defendants to undercomply with impunity.
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some relatively weak claims and defenses but increase the pursuit of
relatively small-stakes claims or defenses; at the same time, it also increases
the variance of possible outcomes and thus may overdeter risk-averse wouldbe litigants.
Based upon the analysis presented in the preceding Part, one might
conclude that in the present context the English rule would be preferable to
the American rule for two reasons. First, by discouraging litigation over
relatively small stakes, the American rule tends to deter the exercise of valid
fair use rights; as established above, defendants' incentives to assert these
rights are weaker than is socially optimal even in the hypothetical world in
which attorney's fees are nonexistent. Second, the American rule potentially
could deter some copyright plaintiffs from coming forward with valid smallstakes claims. On the other hand, the English rule may exert some
countervailing inhibitory effect upon risk-averse plaintiffs or defendants by
increasing the variance of possible outcomes. This effect would tend to be
smaller, however, if the merits of the claim or defense at issue are relatively
certain to begin with.1 '
The preceding analysis is consistent with some observations made
02
by Judge Posner in Assessment Technologies, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc.1
Characterizing "the strength of the prevailing party's case and the amount of
damages or other relief the party obtained" as the "two most important
considerations, " 0 3 judge Posner suggests:
If the case was a toss-up and the prevailing party obtained generous
damages, or injunctive relief of substantial monetary value, there is
no urgent need to add an award of attorneys' fees. But if at the
other extreme the claim or defense was frivolous and the prevailing
party obtained no relief at all, the case for awarding him attorneys'
fees is compelling. As we said with reference to the situation in
which the prevailing plaintiff obtains only a small award of
damages, "the smaller the damages, provided there is a real, and
especially a willful, infringement, the stronger the case for an
award of attorneys' fees .... [W] e go so far as to suggest, by way of

refinement of the Fogerty standard, that the prevailing party in a
copyright case in which the monetary stakes are small should have
a presumptive entitlement to an award of attorneys' fees." When
the prevailing party is the defendant, who by definition receives not

101.
SeeJohn J. Donohue III, Optingfor the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can't Remember
the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1099-1102, 1118 (1991) (arguing that, if
transaction costs were zero, then adopting either the American or English rule would have no
effect on the rate of settlement; but that the English rule is, in general, likely to be the more
efficient rule).
102. Assessment Techs. LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 361 F.3d 434, 436-37 (7th Cir. 2004).
103. Id. at 436.

FAIR USE AND COPYRIGHT OVERENFORCEMENT

1307

a small award but no award, the presumption in favor of awarding
fees is very strong. For without the prospect of such an award, the
party might be forced into a nuisance
settlement or deterred
10 4
altogether from exercising his rights.
As Nimmer and Nimmer observe, Judge Posner's remark concerning
prevailing defendants "turns on its head the old dual approach, which
favored awards for prevailing plaintiffs over those to prevailing
defendants. " 105 Indeed, it would be only a small step from Judge Posner's
proposal to what might be termed a "one-sided English Rule," under which
prevailing copyright defendants would be awarded attorney's fees for
sufficiently high values of Pr, while prevailing plaintiffs generally would not
obtain fee awards as long as they obtained "generous damages ...
or
injunctive relief of substantial monetary value."10 6 In terms of the expressions
above, for values of P, in excess of some critical amount, a = 1 and P3
= 0, thus
reducing expression (1) to PAV, + (1 - PA) [P,(Vu) - (1 - P,)(CU + D + E)] R and expression (2) to (1 - P,) (D + I - Co) - PF(CU + Co) - R o . Without the

prospect of liability for one's own or one's opponent's attorney's fees
deterring the assertion of legitimate fair use rights, users would be more
likely to use and owners would be more likely to acquiesce, all other things
being equal.
It seems likely that the adoption of a one-sided English rule, assuming
its consistency with Fogerty, would achieve some modest success in terms of
discouraging the overenforcement of weak copyright claims. But its
significance should not be exaggerated. For the rule to have the desired
effect in a large number of cases, users must be aware of their rights and
confident they will be able to find attorneys who are willing to take their
cases in exchange for the prospect of a court-ordered fee down the road.
And users must be willing to litigate, if necessary, all the way through the
end of trial. As Michael Meurer observes, "[t]he prospect of recovering
attorney's fees after trial has no value to a defendant who goes bankrupt
before trial, and perhaps little value to a defendant who suffers financial
distress because of trial cost and delay."'0 7 Moreover, to the extent PF

104.

Id. at 436-37 (internal citations omitted); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F.

Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits,

and the Role of Rule 11, 25J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 397 (1996) ("[Ilf there is an excessive incentive to
sue in the absence of fee shifting, then the ideal fee-shifting rule would impose a net expected
cost on the plaintiff in the marginal case.").
105. 4 NIMMER &NIMMER, supranote 6, § 14.10[D] [3] [b], at 14-209.
106. Assessment Techs., 361 F.3d at 436.
107. Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property
Litigation,44 B.C. L. REv. 509, 537-38 (2003). Meurer's article does not discuss fair use as such,
but he makes some interesting recommendations for reducing the anticompetitive assertion of
IP rights through such means as restricting the availability of preliminary injunctions and
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remains relatively unpredictable, risk-averse users may still shy away from
exercising fair use ights to which they are entitled.""8 Overall, reform is
probably desirable, but even a one-sided English rule may not prevent
copyright overenforcement in a large number of cases.
E.

INcREASING ACCURACY

Another set of proposed reforms is directed towards increasing the
accuracy of fair use determinations. '9Assuming that fair use determinations
are not one-hundred percent accurate under the current state of affairsthat courts sometimes enter judgment for copyright plaintiffs when TCu > V"
> Vo or V, > Vo > V,, and sometimes enter judgment for defendants when
these conditions do not hold-measures designed to increase accuracy
might seem desirable for several reasons. The most obvious is that accuracy
is good in and of itself, insofar as judicial errors frustrate sound copyright
policy and undermine confidence in the legal system. If, instead, courts
systematically err in favor of one party or the other, then copyright rights
either will be over- or underenforced. Systematic over- or underenforcement
will in turn influence the parties' expectations. If the parties believe that
courts systematically err in favor of copyright plaintiffs, P, is lower than it
should be (and, conversely, if the parties believe that courts systematically
err in favor of copyright defendants, P, is higher than it should be). All
other things being equal, some defendants will too readily forgo use (or if P,
is higher than it should be, some plaintiffs will too readily acquiesce).
On the other hand, if courts err more or less randomly without
systematic bias in favor of plaintiffs or defendants, one might expect the
errors to roughly cancel each other out over time, thus resulting in neither
over- nor underenforcement in the long run. Random errors do affect
predictability, however; and as discussed below, the greater the variance
associated with PF, the more likely a risk-averse party will be willing to
compromise a claim for less than its actuarial value. If copyright defendants
are on average more risk averse than copyright plaintiffs, a substantial
probability of random error may deter them from asserting valid fair use

modifying existing law to make it easier for defendants to obtain summary judgment, as well as
by awarding attorney's fees.
108. On the other hand, a court that has found a use to be fair might overestimate what the
value of P, was ex ante. This hindsight bias would work to the benefit of defendants. To the
extent hindsight bias exists, however, it could work in the opposite direction as well: a court that
has found that a use is not fair might accord an inappropriately low ex ante value to PF and
award fees to the prevailing plaintiff under an even-handed approach.
109. 1 use the term "accuracy" here to mean "correctness in light of the relevant policies." A
decision that fails to find fair use when TCu > Vu > V0 or V, > Vo > V., or that finds fair use when
these conditions are not present, is therefore inaccurate in the sense used above. Put another
way, measures that increase accuracy are synonymous with measures that reduce the risk of
error.
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rights." ° Additional investments in accuracy therefore may improve not only
the courts' actual performance, but also the parties' perceptions of that
performance and thus lead to outcomes that are more in line with sound
copyright policy.
There are nevertheless several obvious problems to consider. One is
that there is no clear evidence that the amount of either systematic or
random error is high. To be sure, many fair use opinions have attracted
withering criticism from copyright scholars, but this hardly proves that the
heavily criticized decisions are wrong in some objective sense, or that the
pro-plaintiff errors are more numerous or more weighty than the prodefendant errors. Another problem is that measures designed to increase
the accuracy of fair use determinations necessarily entail additional costs.
These costs might include educating judges in the law and economics of fair
use, demanding that they take more time to sift through the evidence or
requiring the parties to provide more extensive proof relating to the fair use
factors. Just how much society should invest in promoting more accurate fair
use determinations is impossible to determine in the abstract. Presumably, it
makes sense to invest in greater accuracy only up to the point at which the
investment is expected to bring positive returns. Exactly what this would
mean in the present context, however, or how one might attempt to quantify
that point, is unclear.
Some suggested reforms nevertheless are intended to increase the
accuracy of fair use determinations. One type of reform that has been
championed from time to time involves reallocating the burden of proof
with respect to at least some of the factors relating to fair use to copyright
plaintiffs, rather than allocating that burden to defendants.1 ' Reallocating
the burden in this manner should result in more decisions favorable to
defendants, all other things being equal, insofar as: (1) in a case in which
the relevant factual evidence is ambiguous, one would expect courts to
decide against the party bearing the burden; and (2) defendants may lack
access, at reasonable cost, to evidence relevant to some of the fair use
factors, and therefore would tend to lose if they bore the burden of proof.
More precisely, one would expect a burden-shifting reform to raise P, and
C. to some degree and to decrease C. All other things being equal, this
should encourage more users to exercise their fair use rights and more
owners to acquiesce. If fair use generally is an underutilized defense, this
result might seem positive.

110. See infra Part IV.F.
111.
See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text. Note that fair use is a mixed question of
fact and law. In general, the defendant has the burden of producing evidence of the facts
relevant to a finding of a fair use. The court is then charged with drawing the correct legal
inferences based on those facts. See Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800
(9th Cir. 2003).

1310

93 IOWA LA WREVIEW

[20081

As with the other reforms, however, potential problems exist. The most
obvious is that allocating the burden of disproving fair use to copyright
owners is likely to result in a corresponding increase in the number of false
positives-that is, the number of cases wrongly decided in favor of fair use.
Whether the increase in false positives would outweigh the decrease in false
negatives is far from clear. Litigation costs also may be higher under such a
regime, because fair use would be at issue in every case. (It is possible,
however, that this increase would be offset by plaintiffs' lower costs of access
to some of the relevant evidence, as discussed below, and by the larger
number of cases that would be disposed of on fair use grounds.) A related
problem is that the expected increased costs might deter some copyright
owners from asserting valid infringement claims. At the margin, some
negative impact on incentives is a possible outcome if the system proves to
be unduly burdensome.
These risks might be minimized, however, by only selectively shifting
the burden with respect to evidence that is more likely to be within the
copyright owner's control or only in cases in which it is prima facie likely
that the conditions for fair use are present. Most of the proposals relating to
burden shifting adopt this selective approach. 112 For example, Kenneth
Crews argues that when the user copies an unpublished manuscript and
produces evidence that the owner had neither the intention of publishing
the manuscript herself nor any substantial privacy interest in restricting
publication, a rebuttable presumption should arise that the use is fair."'
More generally, Matthew Africa argues in favor of allocating to the copyright
owner the burden with respect to fair use factor four of 17 U.S.C. § 107-the
effect of the use on the market for or value of the copyright work-on the
ground that copyright owners typically have better access to information
regarding the feasibility of licensing than do defendants. 14 And David Lange
112. But see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure:Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV.
975, 1000, 1023 (2002) (proposing that, as part of a fair use balancing test, a court must first
"determine whether the copyright owner has shown '[by a preponderance of the evidence] that
some meaningful likelihood of [actual or] future harm to the work's market value exists'";
second, whether the owner has "demonstrate [d], by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
use at issue will reduce both her revenues and the output of creative works at the margins"; and
third, to consider "whether, on balance, society would be better or worse off by allowing the use
to continue" (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)));
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44

Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. REv. 697, 719-22 (2003) (arguing that allocating the
burden to the defendant violates the First Amendment). See also Matthew J. Sag, Beyond
Abstraction: The Law and Economics of Copyright Scope and Doctrinal Efficiency, 81 TUL. L. REV. 187,

239-45 (2006) (critiquing Lunney's proposed case-by-case cost-benefit analysis as impractical
and speculative).
113.

See Kenneth D. Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of Proof and the Integrity of

Copyright, 31 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1, 68 (1999).
114. See Matthew Africa, Comment, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New
Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1178 (2000).
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and Jennifer Lange Anderson argue in favor of a rebuttable presumption of
fair use in all cases involving transformative uses, reasoning that this
approach better accommodates the user's First Amendment interest in
115
freedom of speech . n Put another way, in cases involving transformative
uses, the cost of fair use false positives is less than the cost of false negatives,
insofar as the latter threaten to undermine important free-speech values.
The defendant, however, would still bear the initial burden of
demonstrating that the use is transformative. But since all derivative works,
not only those that amount to fair uses, are necessarily transformative,
copyright owners in effect would bear the burden of disproving fair use in
every case involving the unauthorized preparation of a derivative work. One
risk would be that, since the dividing line between copies and derivative
works is often unclear, copyright owners in effect would bear the burden of
disproving fair use in a large number, perhaps the majority, of copyrightinfringement cases. The liability-rule option' 6 might be a simpler
alternative, although it gives rise to potentially difficult problems relating to
the quantification of damages.
On balance, Africa's proposal would have relatively general applicability
and might be easier for some courts to swallow than the Lange-Lange
Anderson proposal." 7 But once again I would caution not to overestimate its
impact. Although a plaintiff's inability to prove the feasibility of ex ante
licensing would resolve some marginal fair use cases in favor of defendants,
plaintiffs probably would succeed in proving the feasibility of licensing in a
great many cases. Indeed, if James Gibson is correct that licensing
opportunities proliferate due to risk aversion and other factors, and thus
tend over time to reduce the scope of fair use, the Africa proposal may not
make much difference at all in the long run, absent additional reform to the
way in which courts evaluate licensing evidence.' 8 Courts' willingness to
consider the reason for the defendant's bypassing an existing licensing
market, however, as Gibson recommends, might increase accuracy if courts
can identify positive-externality-generating uses and accord less weight to
bypassed licensing markets in those types of cases.' 9
115. David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson, Copyright, Fair Use, and Transformative
Critical Appropriation I (working paper), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/
langeand.pdf.
116.

See supraPart W.A.

117. Africa himself believes the change would probably have to be accomplished
legislatively, however. Africa, supra note 114, at 1178.
118. See supra note 44.
119. See Gibson, supranote 1, at 948-49; see also WendyJ. Gordon, The "Why" of Markets: Fair
Use and Circularity, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 371, 372 (2007), http://yalelawjournal.org/
images/pdfs/547.pdf (stating that a defendant should have "no fair use claim if market
institutions are the proper locus for allocating the use, and if the particular market is working
well," but that the fair use claim "should prevail (1) if the use is one that is of a general type not
well allocated through markets, or (2) if the particular market is deeply flawed").
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INCREASING PREDICTABILITY

A final set of proposed reforms is directed toward decreasing the
notorious unpredictability of fair use determinations. 12 In terms of the
expressions above, increasing predictability reduces the variance associated
with PF and thus reduces both R, and R o .If we assume that users typically are
more risk averse than owners-a generalization that may well be untrue in
many cases, but which is consistent with the intuition that the relevant class
of users consists in large part of individuals, while the relevant class of
owners is made up of firms -one result would be to decrease users' private
costs of asserting valid fair use rights. Greater predictability also would likely
reduce the cost of litigation (C), because predictability reduces information
asymmetries that can induce parties to litigate based upon differing
estimates of the likely outcome at trial. It also can reduce the number of
issues or sub-issues that one would need to litigate, for example, by
displacing a multifactor test with a bright-line rule.
One way to achieve more predictability would be to substitute
predictable fair use rules for the relatively unpredictable, but flexible,
standards that currently hold sway. An arbitrary reform would be a rule that
appropriating x seconds of music, or y lines of text, is always and necessarily
a fair (or de minimis) use. Alternatively, one could adopt a slightly more
flexible rule that x seconds or y lines are presumptively
• 123 l fair uses, but provide
plaintiffs an opportunity to rebut the presumption. Various guidelines for
the use of copyrighted works in education, such as the Agreement on
Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions,
promulgated in 1976 by the Ad Hoc Committee of Copyright Law Revision
and the Authors League of America, already function in this manner to
some extent.12 4 Although these guidelines lack the force of law, courts and

120. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 6, at 287 ("[T]he problem with the four [fair use] factors
is they are malleable enough to be crafted to fit either point of view."); Molly Shaffer Van
Houweling, Safe Harbors in Copyright 2 (working paper) (2006), available at http://
www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/VanHouweling.pdf
(describing fair use
determinations as being "based on an ad hoc and open-ended analysis that is notoriously
unpredictable").
121.
See, e.g.,
Jeremy Bulow, The Gaming of PharmaceuticalPatents, in 4 INNOVATION POLICY
AND THE ECONOMY 145, 162 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2004) ("[B]asic capital market theory
would say that if the litigation risk is nonsystematic and the firms' managers act as fiduciaries for
well-diversified stockholders, then the firms should be risk-neutral regarding the litigation."); cf
Gibson, supranote 1, at 893-94 (stating that copyright owners also are likely to be risk averse, in
part due to constraints imposed by errors and omissions insurers).
122. Gibson raises this possibility, using almost precisely the same example. See Gibson,
supra note 1, at 937. Parchomovsky and Goldman also propose fair use minima along these
lines. See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 2, at 1511.
123. Mazzone recommends a rule of this nature. See Mazzone, supra note 90, at 1090-93.
124.
See AGREEMENT ON GUIDELINES FOR CLASSROOM COPYING IN NOT-FOR-PROFIT
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BOOKS AND PERIODICALS, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476,
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copyright holders generally view adherence to these guidelines as falling
within fair use.15
The downside of increasing predictability should be apparent. The
principal drawback is that predictability is only tangentially related to
accuracy; outcomes could be predictably wrong. To the extent flexibility is
essential to achieving accurate outcomes, predictable rules undermine
sound policy. Of particular concern to users is the possibility that rules will
be underinclusive of the various uses that might be consistent with either of
the two rationales for fair use (though rules could be overinclusive as well).
Despite these concerns, many countries appear to prefer a relatively brightline approach to the vagaries of our fair use doctrine (or the analogous but
typically less expansive "fair dealing" doctrine applied in countries within
the British Commonwealth). France and Germany, for example, have no fair
use or fair dealing exception, but they include within their copyright statutes
a long list of lawful uses such as parody, criticism, reporting, and (in
Germany) "free uses" that appear similar to the American concept of
transformative uses. 12 6 But even in these countries, the exceptions are not
absolute. Courts must still determine whether a parody takes more than is
necessary to achieve its purpose or if a use is sufficiently transformative to
avoid condemnation. In practice, then, the rules are hardly bright-line at all.
To my knowledge, no country's statute adopts the true bright-line approach
suggested above (e.g., "appropriating x seconds of music is always

at 68-70 (1976),

reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681-88; see also GUIDELINES FOR
EDUCATIONAL USES OF Music, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 70-71 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5684; BRUCE A. LEHMAN, THE CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE: FINAL REPORT TO
THE COMMISSIONER ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE 14 (1998), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/confu/confurep.pdf;
EDUC. MULTIMEDIA
FAIR USE GUIDELINES DEV. COMM., FAIR USE GUIDELINES FOR EDUCATIONAL MULTIMEDIA (1996),

availableat http://www.ccumc.org/system/files/MMFUGuides.pdf.
125. See Ann Bartow, Electifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Book, 48
VILL. L. REv. 13, 33 n.69 (2003). A related recommendation might involve the adoption of
industry-wide "best practices" that recognize the utility of a relatively broad fair use exception.
See AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 1, at 30 (proposing the adoption of "models of 'best
practices' for the incorporation of preexisting copyrighted materials by documentary

filmmakers, based on collective discussions by distinguished creators of the ways in which they
actually do and reasonably could use such materials" and suggesting that "[tihe imprimatur of
leading professional associations on such models would provide crucial legitimacy"). This
approach might succeed in avoiding some of the problems I flag in the text above with respect
to copyright guidelines.
126. See German Copyright Law, supra note 33, pt. 1, ch. 4, §. 24(1) ("An independent work
created by free use of the work of another person may be published and exploited without the
consent of the author of the used work."). "Free use" is said to be analogous to "transformative
use" under U.S. law. J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW § 10:23, at 449-50 & n.27 (2d ed.
2003).

1314

93 IOWA LA WRE VIEW

[20081

permitted"), presumably because such an approach leaves judges with
too
12 7
little discretion to tailor their decisions to the facts of a particular case.
Yet another problem with rules that would displace fair use standards is
that they are likely to reflect interest-group bias. A frequently voiced
complaint concerning the educational guidelines referenced above, for
example, is that
they largely reflect the interests of the content owners who
128
them.
drafted
Perhaps a better option would be to combine the bright-line and
traditional approaches in a third alternative consisting of fair use minima, or
safe harbors, and the more nuanced fair use standard for cases falling
outside the safe harbors. In theory, the educational guidelines come close to
embodying this approach, though they are often criticized not only as
reflecting the interests of their drafters but also for having become de facto
rules-statutory maxima, not minima-from which users depart at their
peril. 2 9 If safe harbors transform into de facto rules, they may reduce
uncertainty at too high a cost in terms of overenforcing copyright rights. To
counteract this trend, Molly Van Houweling proposes that policymakers
should explore the possibility of reducing the "cost" of safe harbors by
conditioning the harbors' applicability upon users engaging in some form of
activity that promotes the goals of copyright. For example, policymakers
could permit users to use "orphan" works (even in cases that might not fall
within the traditional contours of fair use) upon showing that they made a
reasonably diligent search for the copyright owner and properly attributed
the work to that owner. In this manner, safe harbors could become less
one-sided in favor of copyright owners, by providing copyright owners with
something-in the example, an assurance of diligence and a guarantee of
attribution-in return for a more expansive permission to use. Functionally,
the proposal is akin to the liability-rule option, in that it seeks to
accommodate owner interests to a greater extent than does the conventional

127. But see Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-OrientedApproach to FairUse, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1525, 1666-67 (2004) (arguing that U.S. courts could improve the predictability of fair use
decisions by recognizing recurring patterns in which uses are likely to be fair).
128. See Bartow, supra note 125, at 34-37; Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the
Illusion ofFair-UseGuidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 602 (2001).
129. See Bartow, supra note 125, at 33 n.69; Crews, supranote 128, at 611-12. Parchomovsky
and Goldman, on the other hand, argue that fair use minima need not become de facto
maxima, if the minima are enacted into law; as they note, the guidelines mentioned in the text
above lack the force of law. See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 2, at 1489. They also
argue that even relatively stringent minima-for example, a rule defining the taking of the
lesser of three hundred words or fifteen percent of a literary work of more than one hundred
words as per se fair use-would have substantial positive consequences in the real world. See id.
If they are right, my conclusion in the text above that any positive effects of safe harbors would
be "modest" may understate the effects of such reforms.
130. See Van Houweling, supra note 120, at 14.
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fair use option and to enable more socially valuable uses to go forward. 31
Whether legislators can develop and implement safe harbors similar to the
orphan-works safe harbor mentioned above remains to be seen. To the
extent such safe harbors would make copyright owners even slightly worse
off than under the present system, the feasibility of legislative adoption
appears questionable, even if on balance they would increase social value.
And unless safe harbors are adopted in a wide variety of settings, their
contribution to social value is likely to be modest, even if on balance
positive.
A second possible reform would be for legislators to delegate the fair
use determination to some external decision maker, outside the context of
litigation, on the theory that (1) the external decision maker would be able
to render a fair use opinion more quickly and cheaply than could a court,
and (2) the opinion, even if not binding on the parties, would in many cases
be a good predictor of how a court would rule, and thus might discourage
the losing party from proceeding further. (In terms of the model, the
opinion would, again, reduce the variance associated with the probability of
a court determining the use to be fair.) Several recent proposals take this
form. Dan Burk and Julie Cohen, for example, have proposed a system, in
the context of digital rights management, that would combine "fair use
defaults based on customary norms of personal noncommercial use" with a
right to apply for permission to engage in greater fair use to a trusted third
party intermediary. 13 They argue that, absent such a system, technology
often will prevent users from exercising their fair use rights, because
potential fair users will not be able to gain access to the works in the first
place.' 33 This proposal, favorably discussed in a recent report prepared for
the World Intellectual Property Organization, 13 may be the only feasible way
to safeguard fair use rights within the specific context the authors address.
David Nimmer and Michael Carroll have recently proposed analogous
systems applicable to a broader range of potential fair users (i.e., not limited
to works access to which is restricted by technological measures). 3 5
Nimmer's proposal contemplates a form of court-assisted ADR to help

131.

See supra Part W.A.

132.

Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructurefor Rights Management Systems, 15

HARv.J. L. & TECH. 41, 65-66 (2001).
133. Id.
134.
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LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 73-76 (2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/

sccr/en/sccr_ 4/sccrl 45.doc.
135. See Michael W. Carroll, FixingFairUse, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007); David Nimmer, A
Modest Proposal to Streamline Fair Use Determinations, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11, 12-15

(2006).
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resolve potential fair use issues in advance of litigation,' 36 while Carroll's
proposal would involve the creation of a Fair Use Board within the
Copyright Office. 3 7 A party intending to use another's work without
permission could request a pre-use advisory opinion on fair use from the
letter
Board, much like a request for an Internal Revenue Service private
1 3
ruling or a Securities and Exchange Commission no-action letter. 1
All of these latter proposals may have merit, but it is important not to
oversell them. Most obviously, although the delay and expense incident to
these pre-use proceedings may be less than the delay and expense incident
to litigation, it is still delay and expense. The proposals therefore do
relatively little to relieve the burden with respect to uses that are time
sensitive or which reflect relatively little private value to the individual
user.1 39 In the worst-case scenario, the proposed pretrial procedures would
simply add another layer of expense, especially if plaintiffs proceed to
litigation regardless of the pretrial outcome-though140 perhaps over time
courts would tend to defer to Fair Use Board decisions.
But there are other potential problems. As Carroll also notes, courts
may disfavor users who bypass the pretrial procedure, in which case the
availability of the procedure could unnecessarily raise costs in some cases.141
And it is not inconceivable that a larger body of fair use precedent could
lead to less, rather than more, predictability. As Gibson suggests, the sheer
variety of factual circumstances in which fair use questions may arise could
generate more noise than predictability; alternatively, a larger number of
bad precedents could render the outcome of future disputes more
predictable but wrong.142

Concededly, it is probably impossible to know in advance of adopting
such a system whether these negative effects would predominate. Even the
potential existence of negative effects, however, may make it difficult to
displace the inertial status quo. Potential users may see little gain in lobbying
for reforms like those espoused by Nimmer and Carroll, and owners most
likely can be expected to oppose it.

136. Nimmer, supra note 135, at 12-15. One might debate whether this reform goes more
to accuracy, or cost reduction, or predictability, or even some combination thereof.
137.

See Carroll, supra note 135, at 1124-28.

138.

Id.

139.
uses).
140.

See Burk & Cohen, supra note 132, at 59-60 (discussing the decrease of spontaneous
But see Carroll, supra note 135, at 1141 (expressing doubt that appellate courts would

unduly defer and viewing the appellate courts' expected independence from the Fair Use
Board as a strength of his proposal).
141.

See id. at 1138; see alsoJustin Hughes, Introduction to David Nimmer's Modest Proposal,24

CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 7 (2006) (similar).

142.

See Gibson, supra note 1, at 942.
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GO FROM HERE

Construed as an instrument for overcoming market failures due to high
transaction costs, the fair use doctrine is manageable, if imperfect, and
perhaps could be brought more into conformity with the social optimum
through some package of modest reforms, such as the introduction of
defendant-biased fee shifting. Once we view fair use as an instrument for
inducing positive externalities as well, however, the doctrine as currently
structured is both inherently flawed and not readily susceptible to
demonstrable improvement. The doctrine is flawed because, as noted above,
even absent many real-world imperfections, users would be unlikely to
generate the socially optimal amount of positive externalities, given their
inability to appropriate the value of those externalities. That flaw, in turn,
may be ineradicable for two reasons. First, the posited externalities
themselves are so disperse and amorphous-comprising social benefits
relating to education, democratic governance, free speech, and competition,
just to name a few-that it is difficult to perceive how to quantify (or falsify)
them, even in theory. Second, the question of how to balance these
hypothetical social benefits against the social cost of undercutting copyright
incentives-the magnitude of which is similarly unquantifiable-is probably
no more answerable than other familiar philosophical chestnuts such as
"Why is there something rather than nothing?" or "What is it like to be a
bat?"1 43 Put another way, the structural problems endemic to fair use
identified in this paper suggest that it may be unrealistic to expect the
doctrine, either in its current incarnation or in combination with some
package of reforms, to induce the optimal amount of positive-externalitygenerating uses or even some reasonable approximation thereof.
One possible response to this dilemma would be to ignore the positive
externalities altogether and confine fair use to the small range of cases in
which transaction costs loom large on the ground that it borders on the
meaningless to talk about externalities that can be neither quantified nor
falsified. Perhaps, as Yoo suggests, we should rely upon copyright to provide
an incentive for the production of substitutes and not worry as much about
lack of access to specific works.' 44 The problem with this approach is that it
contravenes the intuition, shared by many if not all observers, that a culture
in which permissions are required in all cases other than those involving
excessive transaction costs is undesirable. Quoting another's work for
purposes of critiquing that work is probably the most obvious example of a
use that presumably gives rise to substantial externalities, even if those
externalities cannot be quantified. More generally, if controversially,

See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS ch. 2 (1981); Thomas Nagel, What
143.
Is It Like to Be a Bat?, 83 PHIL. REv. 4 (1974).
SeeYoo, Public Good Economics, supranote 1, 637-44.
144.
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creativity itself may be stymied if creators are unable to reflect the world
around them, including its cultural manifestations. For the individual
creator of a new multimedia work, the appropriation of a few seconds of a
motion picture, or of a few lines from a song or poem, may well be le mot
juste. But even if this view is correct, it provides little insight on how to
resolve the fair use dilemma. Some of the reforms discussed above, such as
the introduction of a liability-rule entitlement for the production of
derivative works, are unlikely to be politically feasible anytime soon. Others,
such as damages caps for good-faith, but erroneous, assertions of fair use
rights, may produce benefits, but those benefits are likely to be quite
modest. Adopting an entire package of small reforms, by contrast, may have
substantial aggregate impact, but also risks overshooting the mark. A court
(or Fair Use Board) that is too eager to assume the existence of substantial
positive externalities risks undermining copyright entitlements, and hence
incentives, altogether.
It may be that, in some instances, the principal value of economic
analysis is that it can help clarify what we do not-and maybe cannot-know.
Here that value manifests itself by suggesting that if unauthorized uses of
copyrighted materials sometimes give rise to large positive externalities, fair
use is a highly imperfect tool for generating those social benefits. Moral,
political, and artistic intuitions, however, may play a larger role than
economics in judging whether those externalities exist, how important they
are and whether some specific package of reforms is likely to lead us closer
to or farther from their attainment.1 45 Moreover, to the extent one believes
the current system is already far removed from that ideal state, a more
effective approach may be to avoid marginal tinkering with fair use
altogether and to consider more fundamental reforms instead. Such reforms
might take the form of amendments to the copyright laws themselves, as
suggested in the Introduction, or maybe users themselves can devise new
means to internalize the externalities that their uses generate, and thus
better align private and social benefits. It might be fruitful to devote
attention to imagining what these new ways might be and whether new
approaches could account for externalities that are not so easily quantified.
Whatever the ultimate resolution may be, perhaps the time has come to
recognize that fair use can only do so much to stem the tide of copyright
overenforcement.

145. Cf Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, $J.L. & ECON. 1, 43 (1960) ("As Frank
H. Knight has so often emphasized, problems of welfare economics must ultimately dissolve
into a study of aesthetics and morals.").

